

OPEN WORD

Giving **New Ideas** for the **Settlement** of the
European Conflict.

Addressed to all British and German



Ladies and Gentlemen *and* to their friends.

— THE AUTHOR —

By A Swiss Officer.

An Open Word

TO ALL

British and German Ladies and Gentlemen

and to their friends, belligerent
or neutral

GIVING NEW IDEAS FOR
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE
EUROPEAN CONFLICT

By a Swiss Officer

Oberstlieutenant

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Respectful Appeal to His Royal Majesty King George V. of Great Britain and Ireland

Your Royal Majesty:

Your great nation joined anno 1914 in true chivalrous manner the contest in Europe in which her friends on the continent probably have felt themselves at odds in strength. A relatively small body of the brave British Tommies ran to the assistance of France and Belgium and managed to hold the intended Teutonic thrust off the sacred soil of England; a brilliant page in the book of history of Your nation. Eighteen months have passed by since; no Teutonic foot has touched the shore of England; and more than this, Your mighty navy has put her war cry in positive effect, she rules the waves from shore to shore.

Quite recently Your Royal Government proclaimed to the world the actual aims of Your great nation, and her allies, and the press of England, of Great Britain and of the Dominions abroad is doing her very best to arouse the fighting spirit of the British nation still more than ever. The severe censorship on all the borders of the fighting nations having the natural effect, that the appeals of the neutral press cannot reach the ears of Your nation, the stirred fighting spirit of the British has a clear way before itself. But will Your Royal Majesty permit to put respectfully the question: Would Great Britain be willing to tend a forgiving, friendly hand to her opponent if the **principal** aims of her war: abolishment of militarism; surrender of Belgium to her valiant king and people; surrender of the occupied provinces of France to the Grande Nation; war debt liquidated in a way that would not reduce the wealth of the British nation, were found? Would Great Britain be willing to abandon all other aims if the aforesaid aims find a satisfactory solution? From the time when I enjoyed the hospitality of England the impression has never left me, that England is a country full of free ideas, of progress, and of happiness. England and Great Britain hold today the future peace in the palms of their mighty hands; they can free themselves in true gentlemanly manner from the stifling pressure of militarism to which the war has forced them. England and Great Britain can bring peace, freedom, and happiness to all those European countries which suffer terribly in consequence of the personal contest between the two champions.

My travels all over Europe, especially the impressions received by crossing all France and all Germany, anno 1915, having aroused in

me the wish to disclose my neutral opinion about the true cause and significance of the present war, and to give at the same time several ideas which I see in logic sequence of the known facts of today, I wrote this book, of which I beg to present Your Royal Majesty a copy with my humble respects. My respects for Your Royal Majesty withhold me from such farreaching expectation that my book will merit Your study; but justice demands that Your great nation have the opportunity to read and scrutinize the ideas about the settlement of the present contest and about future lasting peace, which ideas I wish to propagate as a small seed for the barren ground of Europe. So I implore Your Royal Majesty and Your Royal Government to permit my book access to the British reader; such permission will indebt very greatly not only myself, also all other adherents of a happy, lasting future peace.

Great Britain, ready to sacrifice the precious blood of her sons, and the wealth of her nation, for the attainment of the high goal she has painted on her golden escutcheon, may she be as ready to open her judicious heart to my warm appeal; may she condescend to receive and scrutinize the seed I wish to plant on British ground! The seed will find cultivation, and whether it turn into a small tree, or into a sweet-scented flower, it is of no concern when the cultivation brings the goal at which your great nation is aiming through the present war:

Happy, lasting peace.

Your Royal Majesty's very respectful servant,

Hans Oberhänšli,

Premier-Lieutenant in the Swiss Army.

Chicago, U. S. A., February, 1916.

Respectful Appeal to His Imperial Majesty Kaiser Wilhelm II. of Germany

Your Imperial Majesty:

True to the glorious history of the Royal House of the Hohenzollern, you have upheld Your Imperial word of friendship to Your Imperial confederate, to His Apostolic Majesty Kaiser Franz Joseph von Oesterreich, Koenig von Ungarn. Your valiant armies have fought shoulder to shoulder with the brave Austrian troops and have freed the soil of Germany and Austria from the invaders. In the west, too, Your valiant troops, together with the worthy confederates, have overrun the enemy and have repulsed the battleline far beyond Your own border. Great Germany is safe, has heroically withstood the severe test of commercial isolation, has proved the great organizing nation in financial matters: Germany stands stronger than ever amongst the nations of all the world!

Your Imperial Majesty, as the true Father of the great German nation of today, gave Your Imperial word to Great Britain and to Your nation that the war is not waged as a war of conquest; the war has been forced upon You, and in assuming Your constitutional rights of supreme command over all the German forces, You have victoriously fulfilled Your sacred trust as soldier: the national defense.

By leading Your numerous armies like a **great Caesar** through the fields of Europe, Your Imperial Majesty has had the opportunity of judging by Your own eye what sacrifices, what misery and misfortune the war brings to the poor peoples who have the malchance of living on the road of advancing and attacking armies. Your heart as **Prince of Peace**, Your Christian spirit, must have suffered much when the reverse side of the glorious medal of war was so openly disclosed to Your observing eye.

As a native of Zurich, the city that gave Your Imperial Majesty a reception so sincere and warm that no monarchical nation could surpass it, I beg Your permission to direct Your kind attention to my dear country, and to all the other neutral countries of Europe. Your Imperial Majesty will no doubt be aware, what the neutrality in arms means to my little country. Switzerland has never wavered in doing the duty assigned to her by her political position between the two great contesting parties; her army has preserved Your great Empire from unexpected attacks on the Rhine, all the way from Basel to Friedrichshafen. But Switzerland is so small a country that such a strain as she has

stood during the long time from August, 1914, until now, cannot be continued by her without risk of complete physical and financial exhaustion.

This fact, and many deep impressions obtained during my extensive travels anno 1915, after having been released from my duty as Officer, have set me working on the idea of future peace. The summary of my neutral opinion on the true cause and significance of the present war, and on the question as to how the principal points in contest might be settled in a satisfactory way, being of worldwide interest, I ventured to bring same to public notice in this book, of which I beg to respectfully present You a copy. My sincere wish, that the mighty German nation may have an opportunity to learn my neutral opinion, to scrutinize that opinion and the suggestions, which I give as natural sequences of the facts deployed in eighteen months of European war, engage me to implore Your Imperial Majesty and Your Imperial Government to give my book, which I will issue in the German language, free access to the great German Empire. And if in consequence of my humble suggestions the well-known German organizing spirit finds a good, practicable way to the settlement of the questions in contest, Your Imperial Majesty and Your Imperial Government will then have the honorable road open to approach Your opponent with a forgiving hand, holding happy, lasting future peace in the open palm. Not only Your own great nation will applaud You as a true "Prince of Peace," all the other countries of Europe and the world will join in a hearty cheer to the grand Champion, the iron Champion of the field who rejected further glories of arms, to the benefit of the then relieved nations of the twentieth century.

Your Imperial Majesty's very respectful servant,

Hans Oberhänsli,

Premier-Lieutenant in the Swiss Army.

Chicago, U. S. A., February, 1916

Sincère et Cordial Appel à la Grande Nation Française.

Et Aux Camarades

Sous Le Glorieux Drapeau Français.

Adressé par un Officier Suisse.

(Translation of the appeal to the French nation and the French army.)

Messieurs et Mesdames

Camarades Français:

As Officer in the army of Switzerland, the country recognized by all of you as a neighbor worthy of your patronage and your friendship; as a son of the small Swiss nation that has faithfully stood to her assigned task of armed neutrality, I venture to address myself with due respect to your Grande Nation, to appeal to her inmost heart in the sacred cause of future peace.

When in April and May, 1915, on my way from Geneva to your beautiful Mediterranean Sea, I enjoyed your hospitality and the pleasant company of patriotic comrades of the glorious French armies, I felt the presence of your greatness, of your high spirit; I felt the breath of the Grande Nation. The happy days of my stay at Paris, your capital of the light, came back to my memory, the grand revue de Longchamps, the joyful displays of royal Versailles, and with them the lively picture of the French patriotism, burning in all your hearts, blazing in all your dark eyes.

For the last eighteen months all the world has beheld the unheard-of courage, the hardest of hardships with which you, French comrades, have striven to shield your Grande Nation, your luminous capital from the heavy pressure and the iron thrusts of the Teutonic invaders. The doubts that have slowly made their way into many anxious hearts in consequence of all the warning and reproaching words that thrilled your illustrious Parliament and your Press before the war, have entirely vanished; the heroic French armies have proved their full value, have stunned the world, friend and foe. French patriot, French comrade, I can attest upon my word of honor that all the numerous Teutonic soldiers, even the most disabled heroes from the battlefields of the Champagne, of the Aisne, and of the forests, as well as the whole of the German nation, home and abroad, have without exception been full of high praise of your valor, of your courage, and of your endurance. They all expressed their fervent wish to me, that after this war the Grande Nation with her heroic soldiers, might turn into true friends to Germany.

However, in your hearts and on your lips, I have but too distinctly read to what extent you are averse to your valiant opponent. French comrade, allow me, a Swiss officer, to put to your judicious heart and conscience the following questions: Can you grudge your opponent that he, called to arms to do his duty to his fatherland, strives as much as you to fulfill that sacred duty as befits a hero? Can you grudge him

when he will paint his history in as vivid colors as your history presents from the early days of your King Henry de Valois up to the present time? When you, French comrade, pass in review the history of the present great war, from the beginning up to now, do justice to your opponent by acknowledging that he was worthy to cross swords with you. And when you scrutinize his deeds of 1914, then do justice to your high spirit as gentlemen of the Grande Nation, and consider on what terrible challenge he is in the field. The challenge of your party did not mean only a chivalrous measurement of the strength in strategy and the skill of swords; it meant more, it meant utter destruction, utter starvation of a great nation that God the Almighty has placed in our world with equal rights for a happy living under the common sky and sun! When the unusual challenge drove the blood to the temples of the stunned and stirred German patriot, when the new war-cry pierced and hurt the heart of the whole of the German nation, did not your own judicious heart warn you that the German soldier's wrath might be liable to exceed all bounds? This is the friendly word of a Swiss officer who feels friendship to all the neighbors that surround his small, dear country. God the Almighty has preserved your Grande Nation from the error of adding to your brilliant book of history that one dark page which would have spotted the splendid escutcheon of French bravery.

My appeal to you, French patriot and French comrade, culminates in the fervent desire to see you readjust your opinion of your valiant opponent. No doubt, your judicious spirit will comprehend when I disclose to you that I have addressed as warm an appeal to His Royal Majesty King George V of Great Britain and Ireland, and to his Royal Government and nation, your loyal friends. My appeal, seconded with the expression of my neutral opinion as to the true cause of the present war, and enlarged with some neutral ideas for the settlement of the principal points in contest, shall be admitted only as a small seed for the barren ground of Europe; and I leave it fully to the great nations of Europe to cultivate that small seed according to their own wishes. For France I have outlined a way that seems to me agreeable and acceptable as well to you as to your opponent; I appeal to the great German Champion to release his heavy grip on your principal northeastern provinces, to surrender Belgium to her valiant King Albert and nation, to surrender to you beautiful Lorraine, and to tender his mighty iron hand for a low universal standard for the armies of the future. But since no victor has ever released his conquest without some compensation, I suggest a war indemnity which does not even reach the value of the dear provinces that he is considered to surrender to you, not to speak of all the thankful hearts that you will receive back for your Grande Nation; they are not payable with any money, they are only payable with the friendship that you will bring, in exchange, to your valiant opponent. And when I disclose that the price for the release of the iron grip will not in any way reduce your national wealth, then your judicious heart

will surely be open to the warm word of a Swiss officer who wishes to his dear country the peace that you, too, are longing for.

My duty requires to ask your forgiveness when in the book, for which I humbly ask admittance to France, you will not always find yourself arrayed on the same high level with your British friends. My book is written for the general public and for the workingman in particular, and for the sake of his good understanding I had to reduce parties to the two Champions; so have mercy on me. Whereas my suggestions are fully personal, **the fervent wish for an early peace, an honorable peace for all the parties involved is a national Swiss one.** I appeal to you, Grande Nation Française, to improve your greatness still more by readjusting your erroneous opinion of your opponent; by contenting yourselves with the achievements of the years 1914-15; by bringing happy peace to Europe, and true friendship to the German heart which was ready for it for many years past. Consider how my dear, small country, and all the other neutral nations are suffering by your contest; consider that Switzerland will be more thankful to you then ever when you reopen your borders again for **peaceful** exchange of friendship. Receive and accept this hearty appeal as coming from a comrade, and from the nation that has proved her great friendship to you by nursing your wounded and disabled heroes as if they were sons of her Alps, the nation that called **all** her boys to array in faithful armed neutrality, ready to spill their sacred blood to protect your frontier from Basel to Savoy.

My God help me to bring this warm appeal to your judicious hearts.

Very respectfully, your friend and comrade,

Hans Oberhänsli,

Premier-Lieutenant in the Swiss Army.

Chicago, U. S. A., February, 1916.

PREFACE: VERY IMPORTANT.

These lines contain a friendly talk addressed to all those ladies and gentleman who are willing to withhold for a moment their own opinion on the present war, in order to learn with a free heart what a neutral Swiss Officer has to say on the two all-important points:

The true cause of the war.

Ways and means of meeting the highest desires of the contesting parties.

INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Plenty, more than enough, has been written about the great European war. But still all the world is asking:

Why, what for all this killing, all this misery, all this waste of money and all the heavy taxation?

And is it possible that the high-running aims of all the belligerent countries **can ever**, and **will ever** be reached?

And may we expect **lasting** peace, a happy easy future, the sunshine after the heavy storm?

In frank, absolutely neutral words you will find in this book a **new, highly interesting** explanation of the **true** cause of the war, based all through on the **facts** that the world has seen during the war, and previous to it. However, the principal aim of my book is to offer and explain my ideas for the future peace, and merely to lead up to these ideas, the origin of the war must be reviewed. We must first see **what** we have to mend, and when we know this, then we must see **how** we can mend it. Accordingly the book is divided into two parts, as follows:

PART ONE:

1. **Why** have we the European war?
2. Why did the Teutons march to **Belgium**?
3. Why did **England** join the contest?
4. Who is the **winner** at the end of 1915?

PART TWO:

5. How can war be waged **more effectively**, without the use of arms?
6. How can Militarism and Navalism be **suppressed**?
7. How can the map of Europe be **readjusted**?
8. How can the gigantic war loans and a war indemnity be met **without drawing on any man's purse**?

Many serious attempts have been made especially from United States of America to pave a way to future peace, but today peace seems still as far away as ever. I believe the best way to induce parties to "shake hands" will be found by adjusting in both camps the erroneous views about the opponent; by soothing the vexed and stubborn hearts of the irritated nations; by bringing respectfully, with due justice to all the parties concerned, some **practicable** suggestions as to **how** the sacred aims of **each** party might be fulfilled without further bloodshed.

My book fully discloses to you that **new way** to future peace. I see an absolutely practicable way to relieve all the nations of the world of the stifling and expensive pressure of Militarism and Navalism. Better than this; I see a way absolutely clear in every point, to sweep the huge war debts in a couple of years, without increasing the present

taxations nor adding new personal burdens. A way so easy that no Ruler, no Government, no Parliament, no Nation, no capitalist, nor any workingman will oppose, because it does not hurt anybody, and because it brings great riches over night.

If you disbelieve that such a way can be found, then please follow my simple solutions, all the thrilling facts I array before your eye and mind in highly interesting review, to the very end; you will then convince yourself by your own valuable judgment and turn your thoughts to the happy future I see in logic sequence of this war,; the bright sunshine for which you were looking in vain. And I cordially solicit a free exchange of opinion in the honorable Press, as well as in private circles amongst yourselves, Ladies and Gentlemen, upon all the interesting points which are submitted to your wise and impartial judgment in this work.

Respectfully submitted by the author,

Hans Oberhänsli,

Premier-Lieutenant in the Swiss Army.

Chicago, U. S. A., February, 1916.

CHAPTER I.

Why Have We European War? .

ALL the numerous German ladies and gentlemen, girdled or plain-clothed, who discussed this question with me, were sure on one point: Germany is not responsible for the war! Exactly the same opinion I met all through France and Canada with respect to the Allies! Who is right, then?

For years past some presentiment prevailed in Europe that a great war, a heavy clash would come; parliaments, newspapers, financiers and many farsighted heads among the general public spoke lispingly thereof. Why? The rivalry in "preparedness" amongst the great European powers was too marked, too hot; becoming too dangerous to last.

Still it is true that friendly visits were exchanged between the mighty rulers of Europe: the Kaiser was more than once cheered in London; King Edward paid friendly visits to Berlin; then the Kronprinz and the Kronprincess paid their respects to England's ruler, to the great city of London and to India; King George and Czar Nicholas II attended the wedding of the Kaiser's daughter in jubilant Berlin; the Kaiser went to greet his friend Czar Nicholas in the Baltic sea, not long ago. And on the eve of war, a fine body of an English squadron of men-of-war enjoyed the hospitality of the Germans at Kiel, June, 1914, warmly welcomed by the Kaiser and his bluejackets.

But these friendly acts were counteracted by events of a very serious aspect:

Germany, the secretly dreaded Central-Empire of Europe, received anno 1913, from parliament and the nation, the stupendous gift of 1055 millions extra pocket money for the improvement of the already heavy iron coat of "national defense."

Austria, whose military and naval leader, Kronprinz Franz Ferdinand, was in close contact with the German General Staff, was doing her best to follow the confederate in the upward movement of the expenditure for "national defense."

Italy, third member of the "Dreibund" (which I will call simply D. B. henceforth), did not follow her confederates on account of the heavy burden which she had still to drag in consequence of the Tripolis campaign.

France, failing to receive such liberal gift as the German nation had turned out, helped herself by adopting three years service for the men on duty.

Russia, the other neighbor of Germany, began her "essay-mobilizations," kept troops moving for the "protection" of the German and Austrian frontier. Asiatic troops were given a chance to study the Polish language. Everything seemed "unsettled" in the Russian great machine of "national defense."

Great Britain, the only power free of conscription, was not to be moved out of her military quietness. But she laid so much more stress on the acceleration of the construction of the super-dreadnaughts, her "naval national defense."

Is that not true, all through?

We all have more or less the opinion that the present war is a consequence of the system of standing armies, of the national defense, of the "preparedness." I cannot fully share this opinion; not the preparedness should be blamed, but the **overstraining** of the preparedness; the **number** of standing troops is the true cause of the present contest. This overstrain gives the "national defense" the aspect of threat and aggression, takes off the **defensive** character. I deal this point here because it shows to you **why** I come to put the questions of chapters No. 5 and 6 hereafter. As long as the care for "national defense" is foremost in the national codex, and as long as this care is in the hands of the general staffs, and as long as the general staffs have **no other** effective way to do their duty then by means of strong armies and navies, preparedness is a "matter of course." So we see whereto we have to look, if such a disaster as we live it now, is to be prevented in the future. I am not going to preach abolishment of war, no; no such nonsense. War has been necessary all through the history of this wicked world up to the present day, war will again be necessary in the future; I come back to this subject in Chapter No. 5, hereafter.

Europe had anno 1913 to me the appearance of a big tenement house ringing with a dozen different tongues; the numerous doors of this house were no more considered sufficiently secured by ordinary bolts and keys to keep the poor inhabitants fairly safe. The parlors behind the doors were reinforced by rifles, shells, bayonets and dynamite. Was that not so, I ask you? In such a fearful house, wherein everyone lived in armed jealousy, a clash **must** come.

This gives you a **true** portrait of the value of the civilization of this day. In former centuries it was mostly the ruler who was in feud with his neighbor ruler; and the poor people had to give their blood and wealth to "clear the lord's worried forehead." People cried for constitutionalism, decried absolutism, and the "despots" were moved and complied to their people's wish; hence we have our constitutions. And what a progress today: The rulers live in best friendship to each other, but the "constitutional" nations have run themselves in such fearful "preparedness," that they must go to war to absorb the excess. We see the boys who cannot hold sticks in their hands without swinging same on the heads of the beloved comrades next hand.

When the storm swept over Europe anno 1914, the papers were full of the talk about Serajewo and the Austrian expedition to Servia. I have found many people on my travels in 1915, who see in the murder of Serajewo an attempt upon the crowned head, instead of upon the **leader of the military system of the Austrian general staff**, upon the strong hand of the Austrian "national defense."

The powder barrel had been lurking ever since the Franco-German

war of 1870-71. It is my opinion as a neutral Swiss, that we ought to be as grateful to Kaiser Wilhelm as to all other illustrious rulers of the European powers, if that barrel **kept safe so long!** This is my reply to all those misled ladies and gentlemen, who see in Kaiser Wilhelm the slaughterer of Europe. Do you remember this same Kaiser has ousted Bismarck, the iron chancellor, the idol of all Pangermanists; Bismarck, the forger of the German empire; the Bismarck who had still higher ambitions for "his emperor." I remember well from the time when I was a lad, how we feared Bismarck in Switzerland!

A ruler who ousted the forger of his own empire, and who lost almost all his people's love and devotion for this act; a ruler who has put it in his head to rule after his own style, wishing to hold the palm as champion of the peace in his iron hand, does not appear to me as an ambitious warlord.

I know you will reply that the Kaiser struck the fire by declaring war.

I fully agree with you on that point. He did it because it is his right based on the German constitution, and because the German general staff urged him to do so. He acted not as Kaiser, but as commander-in-chief of all the German forces on land and sea, as spokesman of the German nation which, through her general staff, found herself attacked in her safety. Why so? Because Russia, at the end of July, 1914, had mobilized all her forces on land and sea, had lifted her iron fist of "national defense." And why had Russia lifted the hardy fist? Remember that Austria had opened war upon Serbia as a punishment, not for conquest; she had absolutely guaranteed that she had no aspirations on Servian territory; Kaiser Wilhelm, so far as I remember, pledged his mighty word for it, too. But Russia continued to object against the military expedition to Serbia, attesting that she could not allow little Serbia to be crushed by Austria. Is that not true?

Well, this shows us where we have to find the original, real cause of the great war: The Russian general staff, burdened with the heavy duty of caring for the Russian national defense, had the military strength of Serbia in his account of national defense, and probably feared that the crushing of Serbia would bring the balance of military strength too much to Austria's side; Austria found herself relieved at the Servian corner.

But we may go farther in our study and say: this alteration in the power of military defense only concerned Austria and Russia, not all the rest of the great powers: Germany, France and Great Britain. Russia might have mobilized only a number of troops for a threat on Austria, and leave the German border quiet. You know that she went to the full strength, altogether. And why? There we come now to the whole significance of the European war: It is not a war from country to country; it is not a guerre de revanche either; it is not a war of conquest; no. It is nothing short of a contest between the Triple Entente (T. E.), comprising Russia, France and Great Britain, against the Dreibund (D. B.), comprising Germany, Austria and Italy. Three to three, and the ques-

tion was: **Who is going to remain the stronger after the contest, D. B. or T. E.?**

All points which I have to take into consideration by following this study point to the fact, that from the very first Russia considered the question as to being one of T. E. against D. B., and not merely a national one.

I look at it as a war between the general staffs and the headquarters of the European powers. To my eye, neither the Czar, who lifted the Russian iron fist simply as commander-in-chief of the Russian forces on account of advice received from the Russian general staff, the managers; nor Kaiser Wilhelm, who did the very same on account of advice received from the German staff, are to be made responsible for the contest; they did what the nations through their general staffs considered a hard necessity. Now, why do I say "a necessity"?

No reasonable man who has had any inkling of the forces of Europe, will deny that Germany had the strongest coat in all Europe; even mighty Albion was always and ever pointing to this fact. And the general staffs, whose business it is to follow their neighbors' strength very closely and match it after every move, did they not share and surpass our own opinion? Can you understand and feel with the general staffs that they could not continue to bear the heavy responsibility when they became aware that they were outdistanced by their opponents? And so it was anno 1914, and would have been still more if Servia were to be crushed by Austria. The very situation on the actual field of contest in Europe gives you full proof that the staffs of the T. E. were right when they considered themselves fully outdistanced by the staffs of the D. B. And so it came that the T. E. refused to go on quietly looking on how D. B. would grow bigger and fatter; they accepted the risk of putting the test on the bloody field of battle, and it does matter very little who struck the first blow.

I will give you positive proof that T. E. was fully outdistanced by D. B.; let the facts speak for themselves.

Anno 1914 the parties stood like this: Three partners in the D. B., and three in the T. E., equal in numbers. And we may even say: **Russia** with her immense field of resources in men and material, with the powerful Grandduc Nicolai Nicolajewitch at the head of the national defense, was she no match for Germany, inferior by far in number and square milage?

France, heroic, rich France, was she not a match for Austria?

Great Britain, with her immense field of resources in all the dominions and colonies, with her mighty "imperial defense" of Lord Kitchener's trademark, was she not fully a match for Italy?

But what do we see today after eighteen months of bloody contest?

D. B., deserted by the third companion, Italy, who joined the very opponent to dash at her former confederates, holds all military forces of the T. E. on land in check. The two central empires, Germany and Austria, managed to overrun all Belgium, a new additional force for the T. E.; they managed to throw the huge Russian forces back far beyond the Russian frontier; they managed to enter France and

to withstand all the courageous, fiery attacks of the hardy French and British troops; they managed to overrun Servia, and to withstand the iron blows of Italy along the Isonzo. Does this not fully prove that the staffs of the T. E. were right when they refused to stand the strain longer, when they refused to go on in such an inferiority of strength? And you must bear in mind that Russia and France were at the maximum of their strength, whereas Germany at least, had greater means in store to grow stronger yet, such as prolonging the service from two to three years, like France had done. Are you convinced now that war was **necessary**?

Some pacifists, such as Mr. Henry Ford of Detroit, would reply, even when the D. B. was stronger than the T. E., this does not absolutely imply the "necessity" of wasting the excess of strength by means of such a slaughter. Very well, I am quite of your opinion! Germany had been the stronger ever since 1871, and had lived 45 years without using this strength against the neighbor as a naughty boy, to which I referred before. I wish to point out this to all those French and Canadian ladies and gentlemen who reproach the Kaiser and Germany bitterly. There is many a giant living beside a weak tenant and both go on together in friendly spirit. Germany might as well have continued for years to come, to be the stronger and strongest in Europe, and it seemed to me that the Kaiser himself was the best guarantee that there would be no unnecessary swinging of the stick. You must remember that the Socialist party in the Reichstag has grown very strong of late, and nothing proves that this party, with some other anti-militarist members of the Reichstag, might not have reached some day the majority and dealt with the "Prussian militarism." And Germany, too, like France, is in the best way of reducing the birthrate of the nation. But then, why was the war a necessity? Because the T. E. was aware that beside the question of "militarism" there was the great question of "navalism." Germany and Austria were growing children of the sea, and so was Italy. Was it good, advisable to let the giant of the field grow on from a baby of navalism to a strong rival? Here we have not only the question of strength, but that of the oversea possessions. And if D. B. was trying her best to grow into mighty naval powers as well, it was not simply for the trouble of having big battleships ready for the people's amusement, but for a very hardy task: to look for new customers, new markets abroad. And so you see the T. E., the holder of the colonial world, afraid of losing her markets, by and by. Since the world itself cannot expand to offer a greater surface, the T. E. feared that the expansion of German trade meant loss to her, as a natural consequence. Is that not your opinion, too? And there I see again why the T. E. wished to settle matters on the battlefield, to give the world a new face, if possible.

Next chapter gives you a new proof that the war started as a contest between T. E. and D. B., and so does Chapter No. 3. Do you believe with me that now we have the **true** cause, the **true** significance of the present war? Let us see.

CHAPTER II.

Why Did the Teutons March to Belgium?

ON THE DAY of the declaration of war between the central empires and France, Russia, parties were fairly equal in numbers: two against two, not counting little Servia.

For the attacks of the Teutons on mighty Russia, there was a stretch of territorial connection long enough for the development of millions of men; but not so on the side of Germany—France, and France was first to be dealt with, according to the plan of the German staff.

Let us have a look at the map of Europe of July, 1914: Germany had two ways to reach France, the one through Switzerland, the other through Belgium.

Switzerland? Particularly the stretch between Germany and France, eastern Switzerland, I have seen almost all over from horseback, so rely on what I tell you: A line of German armies taking foot from Basel to Konstanz in the rear of the Rhine, could swing round through Thurgau, Zurich, Aargau and climb the Jura to meet the French on the western border of Switzerland. It is no military secret of any importance that before the war all this stretch of country was not strongly fortified; a few prepared trenches around the Hauenstein, etc., do not count much against an army that was able to reduce such mighty strongholds as Lutich, Namur, Maubeuge, etc. Switzerland offered very good roads, rails; is just there not interjected with rocky Alps and gorges, and the communication to Germany was a very large one, extending from Basel to Friedrichshafen. Bear further in mind that Austria and Italy were confederates, that they, too, border Switzerland on two sides, and that they might have tackled the Swiss frontier east and south to draw and split the small Swiss forces. You will readily believe me, British and French, that the Swiss army would not have looked quietly on all this pageant. I know I can attest this from my inmost heart, although the Swiss holds the visit of the Kaiser and of General-Oberst v. Moltke, the head of the German staff, well in mind, and have due respect for the German iron coat. Anyhow we would have stood to our trust, no matter how great the odds were against us. But I say: Switzerland ought to be very thankful to the Kaiser and his chief of staff that they did not make the **mistake** of choosing their way through Switzerland, which had cheered them a few years ago, to come again! I have for a long time longed for a substantial proof that the Kaiser, the great war lord of the German empire, and his second hand in military business General-Oberst v. Moltke, really consider

the Swiss a good soldier; it is a pride for the man in girdle and spurs to be qualified fit for his task. Can we accept the German move to Belgium as a proof of this? Not absolutely: I am not so proud as to say that the Kaiser and his chief of staff "feared" to go through Switzerland; they did not go there because it would have been a mistake, and the German staff will not make mistakes if they can help it.

When I free-heartedly attest that the German troops would probably have managed, at the beginning of the war in the first week of August, 1914, to cross Switzerland, as they have overrun stronger Belgium, then I feel it my duty toward my comrades in arms in Switzerland, to state that this assertion has force only for the **beginning** of the war. Switzerland being a country which had an army for defensive work only—Switzerland could not afford to keep her territories so much fortified as a European war all around would naturally require. The fortifications were put merely where they could be made impregnable; that is in the high Alps, all the rest of the country had to be entrusted to the care of the soldier of the field, and that is why eastern Switzerland was bare of fortifications. And when I say that my assertion has only force for the **beginning** of the war, then I mean by this to warn anyone, that in the year of 1915 things looked quite different. The Swiss army was not called to arms simply to expect **in the barracks** some friend who might cross swords and exchange swift bullets with her; the Swiss army had to work as hard as any army in the field, to throw up fortifications and trenches all over the country, and get in the best of trim for what might come. I state this also to the relief of all those anxious friends in the neighborhood of small Switzerland who might perhaps go so far as to expect right now an invasion of the opponent in consequence of my open-hearted disclosures.

Why did I call it a mistake to take the way through Switzerland? I will explain this:

The fact in itself that the Swiss neutrality was attacked, broken, disregarded by Germany would have brought Belgium into the field, too. And why? Considering that the Swiss Army, although doing her best, would not have been able to withstand and prevent the sudden rush of the huge German avalanche on France through the Jura, we see that the German forces would have swept the roads to Paris, Calais and Boulogne, as the march on that side would probably have taken less time than that through Luttich, Brussels, Antwerp. I will not overrate the German force, but we are bound to look at things the straight way if we want to be neutral.

Now, figure it out for yourself what it would have meant to Belgium to have the German armies all around her from the Dutch frontier to Dunquerque and John Bull about to throw his teeth at the iron Michel by any means possible. Could Belgium have remained out of the contest? I say no. So the German staff did not only take Great Britain right away in his account, but Belgium too, and you have the proof in his first move that he did.

He knew very well, too, that the case is different with regard to neutrality when Belgium is attacked instead of Switzerland. Belgium,

attacked and overrun, did not in the least change the strategical position of Switzerland. All around Switzerland the frontier remained the same, whether Belgium was attacked or not, and whether England joined the contest or not. So Switzerland did the best that she could: To keep quiet and remain within her task of neutrality, no matter whether the German staff wished so or not. So, you see, what a treaty for neutrality is worth, no matter how nicely it is pasted up, signed, witnessed and sealed. When your neighbor wishes to fight you, the paper is but very soft stuff to receive and to ward off the blow; you simply have got to fight, too. And it is an honorable page in the history of Belgium that King and army stood to their duty. Belgium had but two ways to go when the German staff asked in the ultimatum: "Give us free passage. We will not hurt you in the least." Belgium stood to her task. She defended her neutrality with her blood, and so would Switzerland have done, too, no matter which side was to receive the blow. We Swiss fully recognize it that the hardy Belgian would have come, shoulder to shoulder, with the French to help us in the clearing of the Swiss soil, and it may well be said that the Swiss, although probably thrown back to the big St. Gothardt stronghold, would have striven and fought his way to help his friends in arms in the sacred task. No German shall grudge us about this.

Do you approve of what I said in this chapter? Then let us go to the next point.

CHAPTER III.

Why Did England Join the War?

WHEN you have carefully read the first and second chapters of my book, the reply to question No. 3 seems almost a matter of course.

Permit me, anyhow, to give some more hints on the matter, particularly to Germany, who in August, 1915, when I left for America and Canada, was still in the belief that Great Britain might well have remained out of the war. To all these German people I should have liked to reply: Ask the German staff why they marched to Belgium and not to Switzerland. But the reply would probably not have been understood in its meaning. These lines were not yet written at that time.

We have seen in Chapters 1 and 2 that the war is a contest between T. E., and the Central Empires, remains of old D. B. Still, we must further analyze whether it was so much of necessity for England, and at the back of her, Great Britain, to help and second her allies.

The fact in itself that Albion came to the help of Russia, France, Belgium and Servia, proves that she considered the quartet not strong enough to deal thoroughly with the two antagonists. This again covers my opinion stated in the first chapter about strength of D. B.—Albion has ever, in all history, been wise and cautious not to put her hand into a fire when others can do it as well for her. You may well be proud about that, you British!

So if you see today Albion's hand in the fire, there must have been some all-important instigation. Sir Edward Grey has wavered from the 1st to the 4th of August, 1914, whether he shall risk his Nation's blood or not, whereas the German staff took Great Britain into account from the very first moment. This should be an inducement for you Germans to rid yourself from the idea that England has instigated the war, and you will do so much more freely when you take in account the points at which I hinted in the foregoing chapters.

Great Britain informed Germany in her declaration of war, or was it in the Parliament (?) that she was **forced** to the step, in consequence of Germany's attack on Belgian neutrality. That is a good, gentlemanly argument, showing the world a friend who does not desert a friend in time of distress. But we go farther and say that England was **bound** to enter the war, even when Belgium, Switzerland or Holland had not been attacked in their neutrality. For the simple reason because the war did not start as a war from country to country,

from Nation to Nation. No; it was the contest between T. E. and D. B. What does it matter to two champions like John Bull and the iron Michel, the two fighters on the stage, when the railings go to splinters? And, behold, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland were the railings around the great stage where the contest between Germany against France and Great Britain was to be fought! Belgium was nearest the fighters. Belgium was doomed from the very first moment when the champions prepared the match.

I refer to what I said in the first chapter about the pacifists' objection that Great Britain might still have remained quiet, awaiting the development of the situation. I beg you to remember that not only did Austria pledge her word to Russia that she would not annex a foot of Servian soil; Germany made the same pledge to England with regard to France.

Now, tell me, could Great Britain resp. Albion admit that the Germans come to Antwerp, Calais, Boulogne, in immediate neighborhood across the Channel? Yes, she could, when she was willing to accept this neighborhood as that of a **peaceful friend**. But we all know too well to what extent Albion coveted the friendship of the Michel with the heavy iron coat; no visit of the Kaiser, nor that of the Kronprinz and his lovely wife could change the true feeling of the British to any remarkable extent—much to our regret, we must say. This leads me to the objection you are going to make: That Albion knew from the pledge of the Kaiser that Germany would not take the French coast for her own, and I am fully persuaded that the Germans would have evacuated all the conquered territories all along the French coast and Belgium too, as soon as Germany had secured and cashed a substantial war indemnity from France. Germany, with all her great strength, would not have been able to keep the conquests in France unless she wished to have the war going on for ages and keep there a standing army of many millions.

Returning now to Albion, and taking leave of entering Sir Edward Grey's office on the 4th of August, 1914, we would probably have found him busy over the following question:

Shall Great Britain throw in her lot with her friends? Shall Albion lose the . . . million pounds outstanding over the Channel and in Russia, in consequence of the inevitable downfall of France and Russia, in consequence of the German-Austrian attacks? Or is it not altogether better becoming to the British to go to the help of the two friends, since it is a war, a contest of T. E. against D. B.? It is true that the T. E. was not an alliance of fixed character. We have heard from the lips of the British Premier only a few weeks before the war that Albion was not bound to anything, in any way. But Sir Edward Grey made up his mind that the British should stick fast to their friends; he resolved, and his colleagues approved probably of his decision, to throw the lot of Tommies into the contest, to help the friends with his fat pocket-book, and to sweep the sea clear of all German craft, in order to settle the question of "navalism" once and forever. Sir Edward Grey, by adopting this step, spared the British Nation the humiliation of being

marked in the history of the great war as the strong man who had not succored his friends. He spared Albion the dreaded neighborhood of the Germans across the Channel, and so he had not to await the pleasure of the Germans to withdraw from that neighborhood at their leisure. Was he wrong in taking this step? From the point of view of the strategist, he had not failed. We see that the Germans were stopped just before the gate of the Channel by a hardy, small gang of Tommies, when the rest of England was still asleep, and did not grasp the meaning of what was going on on the Continent. And today you see that, whereas on the military side Albion could only gain the stopping of the Germans at the gates of the Channel, but did not yet succeed in her endeavors of clearing French soil from German invasion, she, on the other side, scores a full success with her navy, which rules the waves more than ever.

And if among you Germans there are still any who are not of the same opinion, that Albion was bound to help her allies, let me point out to you the most important instigation I see in the whole matter?

Germans, your own chivalrous Kaiser gave the gentlemen on the other side of the Channel the example of what a friend is to a friend. When Russia clenched her fist as a consequence of the war between Austria and Serbia, this fist was directed only to Austria and nobody else. But the Austrian Empire is governed by the pious, silver-haired Kaiser Franz Joseph, and Kaiser Wilhelm is his friend. And only when Kaiser Wilhelm had firmly, as a friend and true to his nature as gentleman, backed up Kaiser Franz Joseph against Russia, did this latter country turn on Germany, too. In the same chivalrous spirit did Albion behave when the test came to her, and no one in Germany or outside should grudge Albion of having herself proved worthy of past history. On the one side you see Austria challenged by Russia, backed up by the champion of the field, Germany. On the other side you see France, challenged by Germany, backed up by the champion of the sea, Great Britain. Is that not fair, altogether? So please readjust your opinion with regard to Albion.

We will see now which of the champions is the winner, as both of them are responsible for what is to be done anno 1916.

CHAPTER IV.

Who Was Winner at the End of 1915?

LET me tell you straight: **Both Champions!**

We will deal this chapter with a gloved hand, because when you wish to have a truly neutral view, I must deal also the bad side of the affair.

First. The side of T. E. with Great Britain as Champion.

Great Britain, the Champion of the sea, has won on all the line where her immediate interest is foremost.

Great Britain sweeps the sea, her navy has cleared the sea from all German craft, smashed the German trade on all sides;

Great Britain won the former confederate of the D. B., Italy, to her side and has all the assistance of the Italian army and navy;

Great Britain has managed, by throwing a handful of her Tommies over to the French shore, to stop the German advance to Dunquerque, Calais, Boulogne. So far, nothing but victories.

But let us see the reverse of the golden medal:

When you put your lot in anno 1914 with your friends, Russia and France and Belgium:

A.—You speculated that a small, hardy gang of a few hundred thousand Tommies would be enough to bring your friends' endeavor to crush mighty Germany to a victorious end;

B.—You speculated that your pocketbook would prove fat enough to fight the war to any length.

C.—You speculated that the gigantic Russian armies would at least prove strong enough to guard the Russian frontier against invasion, and to keep thus a huge German force in the East;

D.—You speculated that your blockade on Germany would have an increasing effect, would bring starvation, shortage of ammunition and of all raw materials, would cause riots and dissension amongst the German nation.

E.—You speculated on a short duration of the war.

Now, British, make your mind up to follow through the line of these speculations as through the line of victories.

A.—Your small, hardy gang has grown into millions, and still not enough. You are on the verge of adopting conscription, the very devil you cursed most as a product of militarism.

B.—Your pocketbook looks somewhat troubled. Your Premier Asquith announced in Parliament that you are financing your friends with a daily advance as high as \$7,500,000, which sum represents about

one-third of your daily war expenditure. It means a daily outgoing of an extra \$23,000,000, not to say a word of what you spend in ordinary budget. And your Premier Asquith was open-minded enough to warn you that with the new armies raised by Lord Derby, the daily expenditure for war would still more increase by leaps and bounds. Some of your clear-headed financiers, bankers, are getting nervous over the question as to how Great Britain will ever receive the advances back that she is so lavishly pouring to her friends. And how shall the huge war bonds of Great Britain find a settlement, which are three times as much as the advances; and the interest, running as long as the sinking is not effected? And are the loans which you seek and accept in U. S. A. a proof that your pocketbook is still so fat as you wish to have it? And what about the wealth of your country? Is it in the upward move when you take the best of your youngsters out of the offices, shops, factories and yards to spill their precious blood on the battlefields, or welcoming them back as sick, crippled poor fellows?

C.—The gigantic Russian armies hold a place far behind the natural line.

D.—The German blockade? The effect of this must interest you most, as you probably have not had the chance of feeling it on your own body. Permit me to tell you that I have felt it at the very hardest of time, in winter, 1914-1915, when I passed a time in Germany to wind up some old dealings. I have lived the German blockade with my eyes, nose, lips, tongue and stomach.

Your blockade had a great effect anno 1914, but not so anno 1915. In winter 1914, when the effect began to sting the German nation, things looked pretty tight for some articles, for many others not in the least. Bread and flour were not exhausted, but on the very verge of scarcity, and so were many stuffs of need on the grocer's bill of fare. Petrol and benzine were a valuable liquid. But for your better information, I must tell you straight away, that the very stuffs which were most affected by the blockade, were in blockaded Germany still cheaper than in "free-trading" Switzerland. This is a fact. So, after all, Germany was not so badly off, despite all your serious blockade.

This is sure; if it had not been Germany, with her great organization power, and her sense for discipline, for obedience to all and every law of necessity, things would have turned out very bad probably.

And when I crossed Germany again in 1915, looking around all over the great stretch of Basel-Frankfurt-Hamburg-Bremen-Holland, believe me that all the German population looked pretty well fed, in best of humor, and full of fighting spirit, although it is true that many a companion in the trains or in the restaurant wished to know from me how long this war were to continue yet. It was not hard to find out that the German people are ready for peace if same is obtainable under honorable conditions and terms. What is bad for you to hear about Germany is this: That all the great Empire looked to me as if it were bonded with soldiers. Whereas, in France and Canada many a lady and gentleman is in the belief that Germany must have the last man in the vast field that she is ploughing with her bloody sword.

E.—Short duration of war? I, too, I acknowledge, I was of opinion that the war could not be of any great duration. We are mistaken; so, at least, we must believe when the Premiers of all the T. E. allies announce that they are willing and decided to go to the very end of the contest.

Now, we turn to the Teutons—Germany, Champion of the field. All the world acknowledges, I have heard as much in France and in Canada, that you have achieved great deeds; that in the company of the confederates your marshals and troops have made a history of the great war such as has never been before. We see it with our own eyes that all the big armies of the T. E. reinforced by the hardy men of Belgium, Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro, were no match to the Teutons, however their valor and courage were uppermost. I see in this fact a contest of which you must be aware, too. The superior number of some of the allied armies was matched by the superior talent of Teutonic marshals. I see an important superiority of the Teutons and of the French over the British armies in the different fields: That they have managed their war all this 18 months almost without any important changes in the higher commands.

You Germans have not only proved your great skill on the field of strategy, but also on that of organization at home, to finance the huge war and to counteract the British blockade; there I see another great victory. What would have become of all your valiant marshals and soldiers if the stomach had had to give in? And if your pocketbook had failed? You have a great advantage over the British inasmuch as the blockade helped your government to keep the money at home. Your Schmitz is giving his money to the government, and Schultz is receiving it for the ammunition, etc. And when you again want money, Schultz turns it out as many times as you will, as it is fully in his personal interest that the war is fought to a victorious end, to make his bonds a safe investment. Such a Nation cannot be crushed, nor can the militarism be crushed in the field, because the very exertion itself makes militarism so much more expert in the bloody trade. Do you admit this, British?

But the Germans have their weak points, too:

Are you aware, Germans, that the very strength which leads you over all the roads of Europe, as far as Constantinople and the Suez Channel, is finally your weakness?

You check in the East the Russians;

You have a strong military guard all along the northern coast from Riga down to Antwerp;

You hold all Belgium in your iron grip;

You oppose the heavy pressure of the British and French armies in the west;

You are about to march to Saloniki and Kairo.

All the world must wonder how you manage the communication, the supply of ammunition and food, etc., for all these widespread armies, not to say a word of the strategical work of your staff. But you will admit that there is a point beyond which even a German staff, the

German organization and power can overreach and overrate itself. And I believe, with many others of your own blood, that you have reached this point. Your Chancellor H. v. Bethman-Hollweg and your Treasurer H. v. Helfferich were right when they announced to the world that the responsibility of all further bloodshed will fall on those who still run on, looking for a vague twilight of final, complete victory. I beg to ask you, Germans, whether you would consider your own warning and discontinue your advance to all the four arms of the weather-vane, as soon as a proper way is found to come to honorable understanding with your opponents? Your judicious spirit should induce you to do such a beneficent step!

We must have a way that appeals to **both** opponents. We on one side see the Champion of the field holding all Europe in check. He has a right to ask for something, if he is wanted to release his heavy grip on Russia, Belgium, France and, what is very near, on the Suez Channel. But this Champion is overreached on the sea by the Champion of the waves, Albion, who holds all the seas in her power, and who has yet the immense field of the "Imperial defense" to draw for further assistance. Are you aware of this, Germans?

Would it not be very advisable for both Champions to let history book the great achievements of the war up to this date and shake hands for a better 1916? I am fully convinced that Kaiser Wilhelm, the first gentleman of the field as much as King George, the first gentleman of the sea, would gladly bless their countries with immediate peace if a way could be found that were acceptable to both gentlemen and to their governments and Nations. To my belief, the only way they can march means: Abolishment of militarism and of navalism; readjustment of the map of Europe, and uppermost of all, a way that sweeps the heavy war loans and the war indemnity off the troubled mind of the chancellors of exchequer without drawing on the Nations' wealth, nor on any man's purse. When I say, I believe to have found such a way, are you willing to follow now the next five chapters? Please do so.

CHAPTER V.

How Can War Be Waged More Effectively Without the Use of Arms?

WE DEPLORE and detest war, not because of its significance, which I see in the disputation and the punishment that we wish to apply to the opponent who has provoked our wrath; but we deplore and detest war because of the bloodshed, the destruction of property through shell and arson, the loss of national wealth, and above all, because of the great misery that war brings to all the families which have given fathers and sons to fight for the country's sacred cause, and to perish thereby on the altar of the Fatherland.

War is a natural sequence of the fact that our small rolling planet is peopled with so many different nationalities, different religions, different languages; war is a consequence particularly of the very different interests that all the powers have all over the globe. There is no matrimony in this world, in my opinion, which has not some casual household-war; no business without some casual friction with the customers. And so it is the case amongst the nations.

We all believed, Christians as we meant to be, that if a world's war was not inevitable, it would be a short affair anyhow. And we all were wrong. I look at this disappointment in the light that you will find in the wording at the head of this Chapter: "If the world's war with all its visible horror is not yet at an end after eighteen months of bloodshed, we must surmise that the weapons used today for the disputation and punishment are not sufficient effective." Do you not agree to this suggested surmise?

What do we see in all the belligerent countries beside the misery and tears of the poor widows and orphans, of the destitute and exiled? I have seen the counterface of the war's medal all the way from the Mediterranean through France, Switzerland, Germany, Holland and Canada, and it looked like this, rely on it: that every father, every mother, every brother and sister, all dazzled in their eyes when they could announce to a neutral that they had someone in the **field of honor**. I was pleased to hear of this patriotic spirit all the way along, and it proved to me that chivalry is still living in our business-age.

It is a pride in the belligerent countries to have lost a son, a boy on the altar of the Fatherland. The wounded and crippled who are coming in from the bloody field of contest are manyfold more consoled, cheered up and presented with friendly tokens, than the rest of the "ordinary sick" of the hospital, although these poor fellows deserve as much cheering up and suffer perhaps more than the hero from the field.

But now, let us see the more effective side of the present war, the side which gave me the inspiration of what we should do in future.

On all the long stretch of travel mentioned before, something over 25,000 miles in belligerent and neutral countries, I have not heard or met one person who was attesting: **"I am so glad that I have lost a lot of money through the lovely war!"** Do you believe me? And if not, then please send me name and address of the lucky fellow who enjoys the loss of value through war; and out of pure pleasure for him we will relieve him of still more of his coins until all his pleasure is fully exhausted. Is that not a fair proposal?

As a substitute for the murderous and disastrous war of nowadays, I beg to suggest the war waged by the great soldier and strategist, Napoleon I, as an ultimo ratio means, to subdue England a hundred years ago; and which is again being effected by England against the Teutonic Empires—namely,

Commercial War.

having as a consequence the complete commercial and diplomatic isolation of the country to be punished by the whole world.

Such a war is more effective, altogether, to **every member** of the nation under punishment. Let us see how this would be done.

In order not to hurt any foreigner by this book, I should like to produce dear Switzerland, my own country, as an example for future commercial war; my country would probably not grudge me for this. But you all would object that this is but a poor example. So I will go to the very opposite, by producing great, rich, almighty Germany as an example, and beg the Germans to forgive me.

Germany borders on land and sea, big and small neighbors; what would become of Germany in case of international embargo? Of complete commercial isolation?

Germany would find the frontier tightly closed on Denmark, Russia, Austria, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Holland; all around a mighty bolt. The sea would be closed likewise, inasmuch as no foreign craft would steer to German ports, and no German craft would be admitted to foreign ports. The German shipping would be reduced to an exchange from German port to German port.

And this complete isolation would have the immediate effect: that no train could cross the frontier, in or out; all travelers of German blood would be refused admittance to the neighboring country, and only the foreign traveler would be permitted to cross the border; no goods could pass the border, in or out; no mail, no wire, no phone message would be transmitted to or from Germany; all payments to Germany would be stopped.

Great, rich and mighty Germany would see in her interior: sudden and complete stopping of all export and import; sudden and complete overthrow of all manufacturing in shops and factories and yards; panic at the bourse; downfall of all value of German bonds, stocks and shares of German companies; great loss on the international exchange; impend-

ing scarcity of raw material and foodstuffs; lurking famine all through the German Empire.

Are there any among you who are not feeling the thrill to the very heart when you have full conscience of what such punishment would mean to the hardy German Nation?

What would it mean to the rest of the world?

Very little, indeed. It would simply mean stopping of export to Germany; only to Germany; with all the rest of the world around things would not change in the least.

I should say in addition, that all goods which could not be exported to Germany during the existence of the embargo would simply be directed to the other countries. All the loss to be anticipated by the punishing countries would be: momentary absence of the money that was expected from Germany for bills due; temporary falling off in the value of the German bonds, stocks and shares owned abroad; temporary stopping of the supply of those goods that were coming from Germany; which are very few.

So we see that international isolation of Germany could be continued by the world for any length of time; there would be no need of great strategical plans; no need of huge armies and navies; no need of loss of blood and shelling of property; no need of war-loans; no great loss of national wealth; and no shortage of employees in the offices, shops, factories and yards. And what is much more beneficial, there would be no widows, no orphans, no destitute, nor exiled in consequence of such new method of war.

And do you believe me, that this kind of war would bring Germany to her knees? Could Germany stand such a fight very long? I don't think so—and why?

When there is no more glory of the battlefield, no more thrill to the patriotic heart produced by the marching and singing troops, no more sound of trumpet and rattling drums and waving colors announcing the approach of the dear boys of the barracks; the quiet, serious people of the cities and hamlets will feel this commercial isolation to the very bottom of their heart. The capitalist who makes big profits by **today's method** of war, as supplier to the big armies, would have no more sale of war materials; and even worse than this, the same capitalist would suffer very much from the complete stoppage of orders from abroad; from the quick shortage and increased price of all raw materials; from the falling off of the orders from inland customers in consequence of general consternation. The ordinary tradesman would see his turn-over shorten, profits cut, raw material increasing in price the more it approaches exhaustion; he would face complete final ruin. The workingman by and by would lose his job, in consequence of the shutting up of the shops and factories; orders failing and raw material failing, the workingman would not be able, physically, to look on the new mess for any great length of time, whereas today many workingmen are sticking to war because it brings them bigger wages and a sure income. Dissension, riots, and even revolution must awake in all quarters, rich or poor, against a government that would prove too obstinate.

And the government of the **punished** country would sustain the greatest loss in commercial war. The treasury would suddenly lose all the income from the customhouse, as there would be no more traffic over the border; would lose from postal-traffic, from rail-traffic, and sea-traffic; from taxes and duties on goods monopolized or taxed; and would lose on all the securities held by the government for foreign accounts, payment of interest being prohibited.

The Swiss spirit tells me that any government who would continue such a mess for twenty-four hours longer than the people were willing to endure, such government would be swept clear off the table in less time than it takes to say it. Do you believe me?

Is that not more effective than the war of today?

Well, some of you will probably object, saying: "How will you force a strong country to obedience, such as Germany which you advanced as an example, the champion of the field?" You are right, a commercial war would be an impossible utopia as long as large armies and navies would continue to exist. So you see that the war-cries of the contesting parties, aiming on the one side at the complete routing of the opponents' militarism; and on the other side, aiming at the shackling by all possible means of the mighty navy, which holds the supremacy of the sea, **the contesting parties themselves effectively favor my own wishes with respect to future peace!**

Before turning to the next chapter which gives you my simple idea as to how militarism and navalism could be minimized to a very low standard, permit me to submit my suggestion for a way by which international commercial war might be **planned and effected**:

Czar Nicolaus II of great Russia is the illustrious originator of the court of arbitration at The Hague, Netherlands. The American philanthropist, Mr. Andrew Carnegie, is the worthy donor of the Palace of Peace at The Hague. All the nations of the world have made gifts to adorn this fine new building of twentieth century fame. Meetings of world-wide interest have already been held within its walls, and the delegates behaved very well when they were together.

Would it fail common sense to propose this Court of arbitration to be enlarged in a way to be a **Court for future commercial war, a jury for international matters of dispute?**

This illustrious body, composed of the finest and wisest, cool-headed gentlemen of the diplomatic corps and of statesmanship, were to take permanent domicile at The Hague. This body should be empowered to receive complaints from all the nations of the world, the complaints of international character only, of course; should be empowered to study these complaints coolly and impartially; and to investigate the matter thoroughly. And if found guilty, should invite the nation at fault to proffer a satisfactory excuse or reparation to the offended. And if this is refused, the Court of arbitration should then fix a limited time for compliance to its verdict, and if after expiration the country at fault is still obstinate to the Court's verdict, then officially declare in an announcement to all the world commercial war and complete isolation as explained in this chapter.

This would be a great advantage over the present way the wars begin; no suddenness, no war-lord who has the power in his hand to send armies of millions to bloody work within twenty-four hours of the fixing of the decision in secret conference with the Chief of Staff. And the punished country isolated by commercial war is no more subjected to the imperious will of the Champion-winner, to his mercy and terms. The country will simply inform the Court at The Hague that the nation is ready to submit to the verdict, to proffer the required excuses or the reparation. The country offended will immediately inform the Court that excuses or reparations have been received; and the Court at The Hague, through international official announcement, will cancel the commercial war.

Everything will turn quietly in the old channel the next day, as by magic. Would that not work marvelously, and more effectively than all the wars we had up to this day? Further, may we not expect from the statesmen of today that they will be able to find the right way to such an universal understanding and properly work out the scheme?

CHAPTER VI.

How Can Militarism and Navalism Be Suppressed?

THE foregoing chapter gave you a striking proof that war in connection with abolishment of militarism and navalism will be a war of much more effect, although this seems at first sight a very funny paradox. The very question itself, at the head of this chapter, is of such an importance, of such great consequence, that I feel and see the unbelieving smile which is hovering over your lips. But I hope this smile will turn into a pleasant one when you have heard my simple suggestions, which have nothing supernatural in themselves.

All the world, girdled or plain cloth, is today anti-militarist to the inmost of the heart because of the present war, except, perhaps, the officers and the functionaries who live under the sign of bloody Mars. But they will pardon me as soon as I have had the time to explain myself. I am not advocating such nonsense as suggesting complete abolishment of all armies and navies. No; my suggestion will move within the acceptable limit and deal only with excess of force when there is the question of abolishment.

We find a body of police, of "cops" in every city, in every hamlet, no matter whether it be peopled only with the soft-heartedest and most obedient of citizens. That is the very thing I beg to suggest for the great hamlet of our rolling planet, with the nations as citizens.

First Hobby, Militarism.

On **Land** every European country has always had a force of police strong enough to maintain peace and order in the **interior**. Every country has had another force at the **frontier**, the custom house force, which takes your nickels when you come home over the border, and who chases the smuggler because he will not pay his nickel, too. These two forces must remain in future, although they have, too, the smell of militarism hanging around them.

Then we have the third military force, the army and navy, for the "national defense," the weapons in the hand of the General-Staffs. And if we can manage to reduce these weapons to a standard of international police, bloody war will likely be a thing of the past, and national defense be upheld for the future.

I am sure we must maintain an army in every country. Why? What for, since we have country police in the interior; have custom house police at the frontier; and have commercial war for external protection and punishment?

This army is considered a **supplementary force** to the police of the interior. It ought to work in case of serious riots, revolution (we have countries which **enjoy** revolutions!). It ought to work in case of inundation, of great landslips, great arson and all other such catastrophal disasters.

But this army shall always remain within a certain reduced limit of international standard, in order to take away all threatening and aggressive aspect that the armies of 1914 had. I beg to suggest that the number of the men in such a force be footed on a certain reduced percentage of the adult male population or on the female population as soon as the ladies get the handle of military force in hand. It will be a jolly time, by Jove!

Could any country reproach the neighbor with Militarism? What does Militarism mean, after all? Does the meaning lie in the big number of troops, or in the fact that standing armies are kept? Switzerland gives you the best example, the best reply to this question. When on the 1st of August, 1914, the Swiss army was alarmed and run in the field in complete strength, the number of Swiss troops was **higher** in percentage to the Swiss population than the number of German troops in percentage to the German population. And despite this fact, nobody decries Switzerland as a country of "Militarism." So we see that the meaning of Militarism lies in the fact of standing armies, especially when these armies have grown to such figures that they are a threat and menace to the neighbor. I see Militarism, too, in the fact that in Germany and in other European countries everything is fitted in military style; all great receptions have a military character; the rulers are received between bayonets and are wanted to say something nice about the men put up as honorary guard before they have had time to see a soul in plain cloth. Is that not so? England, the anti-militarist country, is in this respect not different from any other of the powers. I have seen it with my own eyes.

If you admit my opinion that all the world is today anti-militarist in consequence of the great war, then you will probably share the sequence I draw from it: That when at the coming meeting of all the countries of the globe, for the conclusion of a world-wide peace, the question of Militarism could be settled in a way by giving satisfaction to the great powers, such a way as I have shown you simply as an example, would any of the Nations object? I don't think so. But it is possible that some of the general staffs would object. They are used to look at things with other eyes than we. For them it is business. For us it is criticism. But let us see. It is but too true that the general staffs, the managers of the Nations' safety, have grown very strong. When any staff said something, it was almost a command for the Nation to accept their opinion. Had ever any German member of the Reichstag been able to run against the general staff? I cannot remember of any such great success. The staffs have, in fact, grown almighty, so big that they were at last bigger than the "boss," the Nation. But this will finish with the present war. When all the Nations agree to reduce the military force to a standard of national police, the staffs will be disciplined

enough to accept the new job and work it on the footing of international agreement.

Can this new national military force still be a danger for the neighbor? Should any such reduced army ever venture to fall on its neighbor, what would happen?

First of all, we must bear in mind that the force will probably not be kept all the time in **one body**, but will be spread over the whole country. So, if any force were to attack the neighbor, it must first be assembled. And there are idle people enough standing in the streets who would notice such an assemblage. And after this the body must receive ammunition, must be fitted "warlike." Have you ever seen an army in Europe, in ordinary times, fitted warlike and promenading the streets? I can say that I have seen troops of all European countries at work, on barrack grounds or in the field, and never was a body fully outfitted for war. And this will be so in future, or may be fixed so. If any such body would march in war-fitting, people must become aware of it. Any Belgian wandering about Stuttgart f. i. would immediately inform his Consul, or any Consul next in friendship, of what he noticed going on, and the Consul might then get some information at headquarters. And even in case such a force would reach the frontier safely without being foreshadowed, it would be but a small affair, perhaps a clash, some advance into the neighboring country. Meanwhile the force of the attacked country is rushed in by trains, a small and quick matter for a small army, and might show the way home to the invaders. And the consequence would be that in punishment of such an unfriendly act all the countries around would at once enter in commercial war, in complete isolation of the attacking nation. That would work immediately, even without the official announcement of the Court at The Hague. This body, of course, would take the matter up and enlarge the isolation over all the world until satisfaction is given for the hardy attack.

The reduction of the military forces of the Powers to an international standard of a so-called "national police and guard," footed on a system similar to that of Switzerland, for instance, or some other system which does not necessitate the enormous outlay of standing armies, will bring the future expenditure down to a very low figure, although each country will enjoy as much national safety as Switzerland had enjoyed up to this great war with her reduced but still efficient army. At any time of the year the Swiss soldier, clad as peaceful citizen, and running about his business at home or abroad, was as ready for a call to arms as any other European soldier who is compelled to dress himself all the year in the distinguishing attire of the fighter and warrior. The 31st of July, 1914, gave a striking proof of the readiness of an army composed of business men of all trades, holding commands as high as a commander of a brigade, or what we see in the standing armies in the charge of a general. And when this National Guard is no more wanted to do the bloody business of real warfare and to smash the army of the neighboring country, a drill of the future soldier for national service will be readily accepted by the young men all over the world as a fine

sport, an honorable sport which will make him a "full man, fit for national service." An altogether patriotic task, such as the Swiss soldier feels in his breast when his time comes round for military service. The future soldier will not lose his business job; he will not have to learn again his trade; he will no more be detained for months and years to get in good shape for receiving the neighbor's ruler between the bayonets. We may, therefore, expect that such an army will not work for the money of a soldier's roll, but for patriotic purpose, and be willing to do this at a very moderate pay: In this light I propose the future national police and guard, and I am rating accordingly the saving on the military and naval budget of the time before the present war.

Second Hobby, Navalism

On the broad sea, things look different. Excuse a Swiss officer talking about the sea. But since I am going to suggest that the famous Alpine Navy of Switzerland should sweep down the Ticino and get harbored in Triest, questions of the high sea will interest the Swiss, too. And it is for the sake of completeness of my plans for future peace that I attack the hardy question about Navalism, too.

The sea, the high sea, wants a police force as well as the big hamlet of our planet. I say that the police for the sea is even more needed than the other one, because the sea is broader, unsteadier, and much lonelier. If we would suppress the navies, or what I mean the police of the sea, piracy would soon ensue. And what a hardy gang of sailors with a few guns and a small craft can do is known to us by the example given by the famous "S. M. S. Ayesha" with the German flag and Commander von Muecke on the bridge.

What, then, if I were to suggest as an idea about sea police:

That the big British Navy and all the rest of the fine men-of-war of Europe be united in **one big continental navy**, stopping once and forever rivalry in Navalism?

That this international navy shall have the double task of shielding and protecting the shores of Europe, and to control the high sea; to patrol along the shipping routes; to combat the danger of icebergs; to succor the lonely islands and faraway shores in case of volcanic eruption, of floods, and other disasters; to run to the help of ships in distress and save the poor passengers; to help the exploration of the deep sea and of the arctic regions? Would that not be a much finer, higher task for the blue jackets, than practice firing and shelling in expectation of battle and bloodshed? And there would be no more need of any controversy about standards of strength, about tonnage of the super-dreadnaughts, about increase of the calibre of the heavy guns, about submarine and torpedo destroyers. Of course, the present men-of-war will have to be used up, and they would do for half a century at least, as there would be no more question of keeping the navy in the highest of fighting trim and "up-to-date." For later times we would have but to adopt a standard of good **patrolling vessels** and improve the standard to fit the task in every way.

And in order to insure absolutely "impartial" use of the Inter-

national Navy, I beg to enlarge my suggestion so far as to say that an International Board of Admiralty should be created, with the best sea-dogs of all the seafaring countries in the board.

This board, supreme in command, to be stationed in a port of Scandinavia, or Denmark, or Holland, just in the midst of the European seas. Every **continent** is to have its own board, its own Continental Navy, footed on an international understanding and standard.

The European waters to be patrolled by strong fleets, each shore a squadron, making the round of the sea. F. i. Albion 2-3 squadrons with neutral commanders, second officer in command British; half crew neutral, half British. And so with every other country. Is there a war likely in this way? Is there an invasion, an attack of English shore likely by such a squadron? The second officer and half the crew, the British men, would look to it that the other half, the neutral, is not losing its head in a foolish enterprise. And there is the International Board of Admiralty in **supreme command**; the affairs of each country directed by two or more directors, half neutral, half native. Would that not make everything sure? The navies of Europe, with one exception, have always proved to be a well-disciplined body, a body of obedience to the letter and to death. So we may dismiss the possibility of any squadron going to play nonsense on the watch.

And the cost of this continental naval police might be canvassed very well in such a way that each port pro tonnage and pro number of outgoing crafts pay a certain royalty to the international treasury of the navy. England would be most relieved, and this induces me to believe that England, the foremost power in Navalism, might perhaps see her way to take my suggestion seriously for the benefit of future peace in Europe and on the high sea.

Is there not some common sense in all this program of abolishment of Militarism and Navalism? If the nations of the world really long for peace, they **must** clean the sheet before everything else of **all excess in military and naval strength**. Only then will the coming peace have a real value. And when you consider the huge savings that every country will enjoy in consequence of such a good beneficial international understanding, a saving counting every year by hundreds of millions of dollars, then we should really expect from our famous statesmen that they will find the way to understanding. I will show you the savings in the financial chapter 8.

CHAPTER VII.

How can the map of Europe be readjusted?

THE WAR which we have seen beginning as a contest between T. E. and D. B. looks to me today nothing short of an **internal** contest of the two Champions:

Great Britain, the Champion of the sea, against Germany, Champion of the field. They hold the future peace in the palm of their hands! With all due respect to the illustrious rulers of the allied countries on both sides, to all their governments and nations, to their victorious, valiant armies, and with due recognition to all the deeds achieved by the allied troops, we cannot master the secret feeling that is making its way to conscience: That if the **Champions** would drop **their** contest and shake hands, all their allied forces would be at a loss to continue the contest at their own risk and account. Is that not a fact? It is fully in favor of speedy future peace that things have developed this way. We are more likely to have early peace if peace can be obtained from two Champions.

On the side of the iron Champion, Germany, we see:

Austria with the pious, silver-haired Kaiser Franz Josef, a ruler who has been much grieved in his life by misfortunes. There cannot be a man in the world who would doubt that this venerable Kaiser Franz, and behind him his great Empire ringing with half a dozen different tongues, were not ready for lasting peace when the proper way is found. Austria did not begin the war as a war of conquest, and Austria does not wish to finish it with conquest. The aim which brought the Austrian Empire into the war is fulfilled. Servia is punished, more than Austria could wish for. We all know that Austria, together with her valiant confederate, Germany, was ready to cede all Italian aspirations to Italy, so far as the Italian tongue was reaching. This sacrifice was offered in order to secure Italian neutrality from the confederate, but was refused. We will see why, under heading Italy. For Austria there is only the question about the war loans, for which the money must come from somewhere, since Austria is with the victor on land and not with the loser.

There is **Turkey** with the ghazi—Sultan Mohammed V—a ruler who eagerly wishes to see his Empire back in peaceful channels after the severe test that has been put to Turkey in two recent consecutive wars, the Tripoli's campaign and the Balkan war. Or do you mean to say that the young Turk party is ambitious? What would Turkey look like today if she had not been seconded by mighty Germany and by strong Bulgaria? What if Roumania or Greece would turn on her, if they sus-

pected her as ambitious? The young Turk party is managed by cautious heads, such as Enver Pasha, and considers probably the present time not propitious for dreams of a great Byzantine Empire of the East. Would they risk a fight with the Champion of the sea, Great Britain, in the front, and great Russia in the rear? We know that Turkey has some grudge against Great Britain, because of the sweep that was made with the sovereignty of the mighty Sultan and Caliph in Egypt. But Turkey must probably rid herself of that grudge if she wants to grow up in peace.

There is **Bulgaria** with the dashing **Czar Ferdinand**. He had ambitions, sure; and it is again in favor of my plan that his ambitions are **realized**. So we may expect him to shake hands for peace. You know what his ambitions were. He has shown you by his dashing advance where his ambitions lie. Can Czar Ferdinand have all the other ambitions which are attributed to him? Can he dream of entering Constantinople as Emperor of Byzanz, as long as Sultan Mohammed and Kaiser Wilhelm are friends, and since these two friends proved true comrades in arms? And would not Great Britain and Russia, too, strongly object to such high running ambitions? So we will dismiss them right away.

On the side of T. E., has:

Great Britain had territorial ambitions on the continent? We will dismiss this, too. Albion, fully averse to conscription, cannot have ambitions on the continent, because these would go to the expense of her friends, France, Belgium, or Holland. And such ambitions would bring her nearer to the German Empire, for the "hold off" of which she has shed the blood of her best Tommies in the fields of Flanders.

Was **France** ambitious? Yes, she wished heartily for the return of lost Alsace-Lorraine. France had not opened war on Germany for 44 years to retake Alsace-Lorraine, but anyhow she wished to retake the precious provinces at earliest convenience. But this time she has not yet succeeded, and must likely bury all hopes to **conquer** them back out of the iron grip of Germany. It is again in favor of my plan that this is so, because this will help to square the bill of the cost of the war. You will see later.

Was **Russia** ambitious? It is hard to guess. There is that gigantic Empire from the Vistula to the shore of Sachalyn, governed by a soft-hearted ruler, Czar Nicolas II. But there was the Russian Bismarck beside the ruler, Grand Duc Nicolai Nicolajewitch, with supreme command over all the Russian forces. It was the belief of many attentive followers of present history that Russia had ambitions on Galicia, on Constantinople, on Persia and on India. Well, we all have realized the fact that Czar Nicolas, on urgent invitation of his victorious Bismarck, entered officially Lemberg and Perscemizl and annexed Galicia officially. So if that ambition has existed, it has been fulfilled to the letter. Is Russia of today still ambitious on Galicia? I do not think so. Constantinople? As long as the Champion of the field, Kaiser Wilhelm, is in close friendship with Ghazi-Sultan Mohammed and with Czar Ferdinand there is no likelihood that Sultan Mohammed will be deprived of his throne. And it seems neither to be the wish of the British and French

allies, as their withdrawal from Gallipoli does not look very encouraging for Russian ambitions on the City at the Golden Horn. Can Russia win it over alone? Probably not. She did her best in company of her present allies, but did not succeed, so she must probably dismiss the ambition as "not timely."

Persia and India? That is not a matter between T. E. and D. B., but rather one between Albion and Russia. So since Albion and not Russia is holding the palm of strength in the T. E. concern, this ambition, too, must be put off for a future time.

Was Italy ambitious? We should say so; she longed for the realization of her national dream, of seeing all Italian-speaking provinces united under the Italian flag. I wonder that there was never the question during this war of entering Ticino, the Italian part of Switzerland, as in former days this part was as much coveted by Italy as all the Austrian territories of Italian language. Switzerland is grateful to Italy that she spared her the fighting. I believe the Italians would not have received the brotherly reception in Ticino of which they might have dreamed some day. I doubt it in consequence of the patriotic mood which I observed amongst the Ticino soldiers when I did service in 1914 in the staff of Colonel Kindler. And the same impression I had received some years ago when I was attached to the staff of Colonel v. Tscharner, doing service at the southern front of the great St. Gothardt stronghold, above Airolo, Ticino. Whether the other Italian brethren in Austria are more inclined to friendly reception of the Italians, this remains to be seen. So far the valiant Italian armies have not won much of the desired strip of country they are so hardly striving for.

You will say: Why did Italy not accept when all the square mile-age wished for was presented to her by Austria? Italy might have saved the blood and misery of the hundred thousand and more of her sons if she had remained neutral, and had accepted. I believe, as neutral Swiss, that she **could** not, or she would surely have accepted. Why could she not? What was the good, I ask you, to receive the few cities and rocky fields in the north, and have all the Italian ports and seashore cities shelled and burned by the British and French? And remember that the Italian colony of Tripoli, for which Italy had paid a heavy, bloody prize, was fully surrounded by French and British possessions. Italy would probably have faithfully stood to her confederates, Germany and Austria, if these had been able, by supremacy of the sea, to shield the Italian coast from the dreaded bombarding and invasion. Here Great Britain scored her victory.

Now, I beg to lead you to the question concerning **Germany**, the Champion of the field, who began the war in the meaning of the defensive, but holds today as conqueror hundreds of thousands of square miles of foreign territory. She openly declared that she holds the conquered territories not as conquest; I believe in this, and you will see by following my chapter **why** I believe in this.

Germany holds actually in her iron grip: The whole of the Kingdom of Belgium; some rich provinces of France; a great part of Poland and of Kurland, Russian territories. And she holds still in her possession

Alsace-Lorraine, which provinces, no doubt, France eagerly wished to regain when the storm swept into the center of Europe.

I will develop before your eye one question after the other, concerning the actual conquests of Germany.

Belgium: Most surprising to me, on my travels anno 1915, was the fact that everybody who touched the question about Belgium put the query in this form: Will Germany keep Belgium? In my opinion, we should rather say: **Can** Germany keep Belgium? I believe there will be some patriotic German lady or gentleman among you who will protest, pointing out to me the fact known through all history that a great conqueror, with a strong nation at his back, has never had to consider whether he can keep his conquest. Such a mighty conqueror is used to say what his wishes and terms are, and they are likely to be fulfilled to the letter. Well and good for the past, but not for today! I have but to draw your attention to the following facts:

1. That Kaiser Wilhelm pledged his mighty imperial word to his nation that the war is not a war of conquest.

2. That Great Britain cannot think of considering any approachment toward peace if Germany insists on keeping Belgium in her grip.

3. That Great Britain is the Champion of the sea and holds as such the all-important power supreme on the sea in her hand; so Germany is **compelled** to regain the free trade oversea in some way or other;

4. That the question of the coming peace is closely connected with the aim of the T. E. to abolish German militarism, from which fact we must deduce that Germany cannot remain Champion of the field from the very moment when peace is coming into force;

5. That all the friends of Belgium have pledged their word to her not to desert her as long as heroic King Albert has not his kingdom back as it was in July of 1914.

Do you now still protest, patriotic German, that the conqueror of today can do with Belgium just what his own pleasure leads him to do? Belgium has already paid some heavy ransom to her conqueror in coin and in products of nature, especially in Antwerp. Belgium had to spend great quantities of war supplies and turned a conquered enemy country into one which did its best to feed the conqueror's armies. From the fact that already in October, 1914, or thereabout, fast trains were running from the north seashore of Germany right through into Belgium proved to me that Belgium found herself very soon in ordinary business under German military government. But is it thinkable that Belgium can remain in German hands; that she be turned into a German Kingdom? I very much doubt it; Belgium has a population through and through French, and as soon as the mighty German armies are returning home, troubles will arise without fail with the German administration. Germany is a nation as full of free ideas of progress as any other great nation on this globe; Germany cannot consent, a great Kingdom like Belgium to be subjected to a foreign regimen, that would bring trouble, and still more trouble. Kingdoms in Europe cannot be forcibly subjected to a new rule, to a new regimen, like the tribes of Africa. And besides these ethical reasons, there are others, still more important ones. Albion

would never open the sea to Germany as long as Belgium is not surrendered. So we come to the question: Shall Germany keep Belgium, with much trouble in view, and reject an offer from Great Britain opening the free trade of the sea in exchange for the surrender of Belgium? Germans, I leave it fully to you to give this question the best answer. All of us know what your answer will be, no doubt.

France: If we expect the Germans to prove themselves the great friends of humanity and reject therefor the idea of a German Kingdom of Belgium, it is but a matter of natural sequence that France will be relieved from the German grip, too. It is to me a matter of course that Germany holds the rich northeastern provinces of France as a trust for a ransom, for an indemnity of war. And France, not likely to be able to clear her soil from German invasion, will probably find a cheaper bill in paying the ransom, rather than losing more of her precious blood. On this surmise is based my financial chapter concerning France hereafter.

Poland: Years ago I had the opportunity to cross Poland, and I had gained at that time the impression by contemplating the quiet, self-contented people, that they are not particularly concerned about Polish politics. It seemed to me that they were people who like to live their life in peace, and who dread foreign administration as much as the Russian. Germany has proclaimed that she will give Poland freedom by creating a sovereign Polish kingdom. Since neither Russia nor Germany, nor Austria have waged the present war about Poland, and considering that it will be a task too bloody, too sacrificial for Russia to regain the Polish provinces, I believe that the mighty Czar Nicholas II will not continue the war simply on the question of Poland, as little as he had continued the Russo-Japanese war for the aim of regaining rich Manchuria from the hands of the "Prussians" of the Orient, to whom he is now tightly bound in terms of friendship. So I surmise that Germany will redeem her promise to the Polish nation and give her a happy future, but I surmise, at the same time, that the new Kingdom of Poland will have to repay the Germans their price of conquest and for the beneficial work that the German armies are now doing in conquered Poland. I believe that the ransom taken into account of Germany, in chapter 8, is the very minimum that Germany has a right to expect.

Kurland: This is a question I do not like to deal with, fearing to discredit myself in the eyes of the Russian patriot. So I beg his pardon if I am failing in my surmise about the future of Kurland. Kurland is a rich province with German and Russian language and from my conversation with some people of Kurland, in Southern Russia, I believe I gathered the impression that they are not disinclined toward Germany. The question can turn only on two points: Whether Russia will be able to free Kurland from German invasion, or whether Russia will pay a ransom to free Kurland in this unbloody way. When I take into account what we have seen at the end of the Russo-Japanese war, and when I consider that the great ruler of Russia, Czar Nicholas II, is an acknowledged friend of peace, I believe that the question regarding Kurland will find an easy, unbloody settlement as soon as the two Champions have found a way to themselves agree on the principal points in

contest. In consequence, I do not take into account any retaking of Kurland by force, and do not count either that Czar Nicholas will burden his soft-hearted nation with the great ransom that would probably be asked by Germany.

Alsace-Lorraine (A./L.): For 45 consecutive years A./L. has been in the possession of the great German Empire; for 44 years France has lived this fact and has not reopened war on Germany for the idea of "revanche." I may even go further in this statement and disclose to you some interesting observations that I have made during the war in France and in Germany. When I enjoyed the company of true, patriotic French soldiers on all the long stretch from Geneva, Lyons, Marseille, Nice, Monte Carlo, Menton, anno 1915, I heard some very hard words spoken about the German invaders, but it is a fact that not one of the hot-blooded soldiers mentioned a word about A./L. It seems to me that they, have found themselves into the fact that Germany owns A./L. And I deduce from this the idea that A./L. was dealt and redealt by the French press and by some prominent politicians simply with the object of keeping the French nation awake and anxious for the greatness of her army in view of coming revenge. When the French soldier was not very friendly in his terms for the "Prussians," I do not believe that this is due to the question of A./L., but rather to the history of Belgium and France of August-October, 1914, and I could feel and sympathize with him. And when I tell you about my experiences made on the French Riviera, that my tourist attire had almost brought me into jail because it looked somewhat "German-like," then you will have an idea of how the French spirit is aroused. I got out of all troubles all right. I wish to state this in favor of the generous French spirit toward the Swiss nation.

Now, with regard to the German spirit toward France: I attest to it with full conscience that it is the very opposite of what I have seen in France toward Germany. All the German soldiers, even the worst wounded, were full of sympathy with the French, were deeply deploring that they were called upon to march against the French, instead of with the French. I have heard this from all the lips, from fighters in position before Toul, Verdun, Arras and in the Vosges. It is a fact.

And the German civic population, too, I have found full of sympathy toward the heroic French nation. I have not read one newspaper of good standing that was befending or slandering France. It is true that at the beginning of the war many a hard word fell in respect to France, because France had entered the war not on challenge, but simply as friendly second and ally to Russia. As soon as the first shot of hot blood had cooled down in the German heads they began to readjust their minds about heroic France and turned into warm sympathizers of the French cause. No dead matter fact of French and German armies fighting each other as hard as possible can dissipate the fact of this warm feeling of the German nation toward France. The armies in the field must do their duty, the soldier on the French side must kill his opponent, even if he be in face of his brother, who joined the adversary. And so think the German soldiers.

What may we now conclude from these disclosures? I conclude that something should be done to soothe the French spirit toward the German, and to make the German a friend of the French. Then, and only then, will Europe see a happy future, from Mediterranean to the North Sea Shore.

And to obtain this, I freely suggest that the great apple of worries, A./L., be liquidated once and forever in a way satisfactory to both parties. I know from experience in traveling through Alsace that the French language is still much in vogue. Whether these were people of Alsace or of Lorraine, I cannot say, but there are Germans in Germany and abroad who admit that A./L. is yet much peopled with French adherents. How, then, if Alsace, that part feeling preponderously German, remain in the possession of the German; and that Lorraine, which borders Luxumburg, go back to the grande nation, against an indemnity that does honor to the rich province of Lorraine? Would this not bring the friendship of the French to Germany as a reward for the surrender, for the fulfillment of a sacred aim of the French chauvinists without further loss of blood, an aim which France must else abandon forever? France and England have fought each other a hundred years ago; they are the most loyal friends today. Germany and Austria have fought each other some fifty years ago; they are the most loyal friends today. And the same we see between Russia and Japan, who were antagonists some ten years ago. Why should not a way be found to bring the French heart to the German heart, which is ready to receive him?

I take this eventuality into account when I deal with the question of war indemnity in the German tabulary.

I have yet withheld from you my opinion about the Italian aspirations. They require special attention, because the case is quite exceptional.

Italy was taxed in May, 1915, when the question was at the height of interest, with full-size aspirations on Trentino, Triest, Tyrol, Dalmatia and Albania. We will see how her wishes might be complied with:

Trentino? I tax the blood of the valiant Italians who have spilled it along the Isonzo line higher than the value of what they have gained by it. So you will not be angry, Austrians and Germans, when I suggest that Italy ought to receive something from Albion for the task she fulfilled in the latter's interest—drawing off a huge force to the southern field of war. Trentino would probably be a worthy prize. I will come back to this point.

Triest, Tyrol? They are not yet conquered by the Italians, so there is no cause to take them off the senile hand of Kaiser Franz Josef.

Dalmatia, Albania? They are part of the Balkan question, which I dismiss from this study. The Balkan question is second-hand in interest when there are such questions like T. E. contra D. B. The Champions will surely find a way to meet on this point when they have found the way of meeting on the more important points of Central Europe.

Italy with her mighty organization called "Irredentia" has announced so many ambitions at the opening of the war—her war—that we must look closer at the subject. Italy pretends that all people of Italian

tongue are "longing" to be joined to their true Fatherland, Italy. All that sounds reasonable, very nice, but I cannot help saying: Is Italy sure that her brethren in tongue, outside Italy, are really in earnest longing to desert pious Kaiser Franz? I have told you, as a complement to this very question, that I have not the impression that the Swiss brethren of Italian tongue are seriously longing to turn from republicans of Switzerland into royal subjects of Italy. It may be different with the "Imperial Austrian Brethren."

When we, in Switzerland, do not know what the majority of the people are thinking concerning a certain question, that certain question is printed on a slip and the people have to say what they think of it. So we learn the people's wishes—not individual ones. Italian wishes for Triest and Tyrol are individual ones, but as soon as the people living in the country in question are saying, too, that they share the wish of the Irredentist-Italian, then we have the people's wish.

What, then, if all the people who are wanted to change colors were to be asked for their own opinion, Trentino, Triest, Tyrol, and Dalmatia? If the question were put like this: Will you desert your Kaiser Franz and pay obedience to King Victor Emanuel? it would once and forever relieve the world of the great query: Ought these countries to be Italian or Austrian? And if they decide by majority to turn over to King Victor Emanuel, still Austria is not bound to release them without some compensation. And there I see a way to help the Austrians to sweep their bill of the war. If the people really wish to get a better position under the colors of Italy, let them have their wish, for the sake of future peace, and let them pay the price for the improvement in their welfare. Is that not fair?

But if neither Austria, nor Italy, nor the people in question can come to a satisfactory conclusion on account, perhaps, of the opinion of the three parties being too much in divergence, I see a way for this case, too. Let us see:

Trentino, together with Triest, as well as Tyrol are neighbors of dear Switzerland. I hope no one among you, foreigners, will deny that Switzerland is well governed; and I mean well in the full extent of the word; and so every reasonable Swiss will tell you. What then if I were to suggest that if neither Austria, nor Italy, nor the people in question can make up their minds, the Italian people of the territory in question were to join the Swiss brethren of Italian tongue, the Ticinesi; and the German speaking part, lofty Tyrol, were to join the mountaineers of St. Gall, Appenzell and Grison? Would they not be a fine lot together? And in this way they would bring the Italian and German neighbors of Trentino-Triest-Tyrol under the benefaction of well-governed Switzerland, of a Bundesrat who has no ambitions whatever except the one to satisfy his Swiss people. Trentino, Triest and Tyrol would retain their "cantonal sovereignty." Switzerland would get an access to the sea. Switzerland would be a safe barrier between Austria and Italy where both of them were never glad of joining each other closely. And would the people object to being called Swiss henceforth? That is for them

to reply, not for me.—Would Austria object? Would Italy object? Let us see when the meeting of the peace is at hand!

Are you satisfied with the “menu” I offered for the European Kitchenpot? Is it reasonable, sensible, and practicable.

CHAPTER VIII.

How Can the Gigantic War Loans, and a Substantial War Indemnity Be Met Without Drawing On Any Man's Purse?

IN TRYING to find our way to a happy future peace we have dealt with one point after another which seemed paramount in the present war; so the readjustment of the European map, asked particularly by the T. E. with regard to Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine; abolishment of Militarism, asked by the T. E., and the abolishment of Navalism, asked by the D. B.; in consequence of this abolishment we have looked for a way to maintain an effective means of war, as the world can not do without some quarrel between the nations. All these points reviewed, there remains the very foremost question for a truce: **Who** is going to pay the cost of the present contest?

In fact I think the Central Powers and the T. E. are actually fighting and continue the fighting on account of this point as much as on all the other four points put together, because no Prime Minister nor any Chancellor of the Exchequer of the parties in the contest will take the risk and the blame on his shoulder of leaving his country in charge of the heavy burden. I have heard on my travels through France, Germany and Canada so many anxious words as to "How are the heavy debts, war loans, ever to be paid, unless the poor people of the contesting countries will be drawn to the very blood for a whole century to come"? And when you look at the figures which I will serve with respect to the war loans of the present war you will find difficulty even to realize how the interest on the war bonds shall be paid. And then a war indemnity is sure to be asked, unless the fighting parties manage to arrive at the same point of square mileage for each country at which they started on the first of August, 1914. The soldiers are no more speaking now of fighting for the capitalist, because everyone of them knows well enough that the workingman will have to suffer as much as the capitalist when the final bill of the contest is presented for settlement. Never have nations fought so ostentatiously about a money question as now, and it is not hard to understand that all of them will do their very best to shift the burden to the opponent. But is there a likelihood that anything good will ensue from the continuation of the struggle? Can the T. E., which is actually in the disadvantage on the field, hope to win the match and make the Central Powers pay for the struggle? I should say, no, it is too late. And can the Central Powers expect a final decisive victory so as to be able to make the terms at their full leisure? I should again say no, it is too late, too. The Central Powers may continue their vic-

torious march in the field to any length of time and miles, it will not in the least change the fact that on the sea they are utterly outdistanced by the T. E., especially by Great Britain; and no skilled soldiers on land will ever be able to destroy the enemy's fleet and regain the lost colonies oversea. For what the Central Powers want is a navy still stronger than the British, not to speak a word of the naval forces of France, Italy and Russia and Japan, and of all the other naval forces at the disposition of the T. E. These naval forces are such a mighty lot that the Central Empires do the best they can to keep their ships safely out of range. But that does not bring a full final victory, and it is speaking in favor of an early peace that things stand so, because it will bring the Champions to realize the uselessness of further struggle and induce them to shake hands.

Through all the year of 1915 and on all the long stretch of travel I have never had the chance of hearing anyone dealing seriously with the question as to how the war bonds will be paid after the war; people seemed to me to be simply awaiting the future to bring what there is in store, and to see then how it will, and how it can be done. Very good, while people do not worry themselves about future big burdens. But I have found no one smiling when he touched this particular question; I am not far from the truth, probably, when I surmise that everyone at that moment will wish that he be dead when the big question about the pocketbook turns up. Are you different in opinion?

It is said all through the world that there is a medicine for every evil; the question is whether the medicine works well or bad. That is what I wish to say about the suggestions which I have disclosed in this book, and about the suggestions I am going to submit to your judgment about the settlement of the heavy war loans, about the payment of the interest thereon, and about the war indemnity which I believe will be necessary if peace, lasting peace, is to come on battered Europe. I feel that my book would be worthless if this particular question about the financial settlement had not found its place too; I am glad that I hit on an idea, and am expecting your judgment with utmost interest. My suggestions regarding the financial settlement of the war's bill are far from perfect, but they may be accepted as a hint as to how a way may be worked out.

The question of the cost of the war is based by me on the surmise That the war will come to an armistice, about April/May of this year;

That an armistice is footed on the pledge of Germany to render Belgium to her King and nation against Great Britain's pledge to render Germany all the lost Colonies, and give her a free trade on the seas;

That the armistice is footed on the further pledge of Germany to surrender Lorraine to France, and the actual part of France that is in the German grip, against a substantial war indemnity of \$5,000,000,000 free of interest;

• That Russia decline to pay a war indemnity and abandon in conse-

quence Poland to her own fate, and Kurland, so far as in the hands of Germany, to that Power, free of charge;

That Militarism and Navalism be abolished in a way similar to that suggested in Chapter No. 6 of my book; I mean particularly the savings which will be realized in following the suggested way;

That France and Russia repay at once the war advances that they have received so lavishly from Albion; so Great Britain is not compelled to continue the war for the sake of getting England's advances out of a final victory over the Central Powers. I guess these advances at the high sum of \$1,800,000,000; \$900,000,000 for each, France and Russia;

-That Russia will have to repay to France the 16 Milliards of Frs. or \$3,000,000,000, which France had advanced to Russia during the alliance, for Russian enterprises, such as strategical railways and industrial investments, and for which France, so far as I believe to know, has pledged her guarantee to all the French investors.

The foregoing chapter about Militarism gave you my idea with regard to the future standard of the national armies; the savings, derived from the reduction of the present big standing armies to the future minimized standard, will be shown to you in my estimate hereafter. They, are of great importance inasmuch as **these savings** will enable the governments to cover therewith the huge sums of **interest** they have actually to pay in consequence of the big military chess-game they are playing and which we hope, will be the last of that sort.

If we have thus found a very beneficial way to cover the interest on the war bonds, well and good. But what is more important in my eye, we must have a way to **clear the bonds** themselves in order to repay to the European financiers the money which they invested in the war; when we find a way for this too, then no party, no power at war will find an excuse in the financial world for the continuation of the contest. The famous Iron Chancellor, Bismarck, has said, and it proved to be the greatest truth that ever left the mind of a statesman, that the war means money, more money, and still more money. Cut the supply of money short, the war will drop of itself, and there I see a great chance for the cessation of the greatest and most expensive war the world has ever known. I can very well understand that Great Britain wishes to score a final victory, when I look at this question not as a friend of peace, and not as a soldier, but from the point of view of the "strong box holder"; final victory is a condition *sine qua non* if Great Britain will shift the burden of the war's bill over to her adversaries. But we must for a long time postpone such far-reaching expectation, and help Great Britain to cause herself to be paid by a more actual idea. I believe I have found a way acceptable to the great Champion of the sea; that way is very simple; Great Britain has an open gate to it; it requires only the will of Great Britain, particularly of Great Britain, to step to that path which will bring riches over night not only to her, but to all the world all around the globe.

Before disclosing my idea with regard to the suggested way, I feel it as a duty to say, **why** I did not mention **Russia** in the scheme.

In fact, I believed to do wrong to Russia, if I were to name her in the same breath. No British soldier, no French soldier, no Belgian soldier has touched the ground of Russia in this war: Russia, the immense Empire of Czar Nicholas II, reserved for herself the right to fight her cause with her own soldiers, to settle her affairs in her own way. The fact in itself that Czar Nicholas II, the originator of the famous court of arbitration at The Hague, has taken supreme command over all his great hardy armies, disclosed to me the fact that he, as father of his soft-hearted people, wished to continue and to end the great war by his own will, and to reject for the future, all those influences which, to my belief, have probably been the instigators of the events of July, 1914. The present Czar of all Russia gave the world anno 1905 a most convincing proof that the welfare and the happiness of his beloved people were to him above everything. I have seen it in Southern Russia with my own eyes, to what degree in October, 1905, the harrassed Russian people, harrassed by the internal strained political condition, harrassed by the worries of the Russo-Japanese war, were pouring their thanks for their relief to "Väterchen Czar"; with knees bent to the stony streets, in the glare of burning blocks, with the venerate portrait of "Väterchen Czar" in their arms, they sent prayers of thanks to heaven, imploring the blessing of the Almighty on their beloved ruler. That is the true Russian heart, and it is but right that Czar Nicholas has taken the destiny of Russia in his own blessed hand. So when I deal hereafter the war's account for Russia, remember that I do it fully in remembrance of what history has seen anno 1905-1906, when the Czar brought peace to his people at a price which did not engross the already heavy burden of the Russian nation. I have full faith in the kind heart of Czar Nicholas II, that he too, will discontinue the war, as soon as an honorable way for Russia, even at a sacrifice, is open for a truce of arms.

No **majoration** of any existing tax can be of much avail to clear the fat bundle of war bonds, with which Europe is filled up the people's ears. Not even the turning over of all the savings books would help much, as the government would have to give fresh bonds in exchange for the war bond paid; the money would simply change hands from public to government, and from government to public again and not a cent of the debt would be paid off. We must have quite a new value, a sort of new money which will not necessitate any new bonds from the government; which will not necessitate any increase of the gold reserve in the national treasury; which will not endanger the value of the currency we have now in hand. Is there a way to such a world—blessed issue? Yes, there is:

Put a tax on gold, say 100 per cent on its present value!

It is a daring enterprise to suggest such an "unheard-of" change for the present world, which has seen enough changes without wishing for more. But I wish to be complete in my suggestions for future

peace, and should like to hear the opinion of the competent financial world about such an idea which I present in the following reasoning:

Does a tax on gold change the standard of currency? I should say no, and will prove it. What is the meaning of the standard for currency? It means simply that all the countries have agreed that there must be a coin, which in its marketable **metal value must cover the full amount figured on the coin.** With other words, when you hold a coin of \$10 in your hand, the coin represents the value of the same weight of gold on the market, no matter whether coined or in ingot. The U. S. ammunition dealers let themselves pay in gold because they are wise business men who know pretty well that all the other money on the market is worth almost nothing when all the European soldiers are shot and killed with the U. S. bullets; but the gold will still represent full value, no matter whether there is a French, a British or an American effigy coined on it.—That is called “business.”

The gold coin of \$10 of today's size is worth **that** money because gold is not yet taxed. As soon as the market-value of gold is doubled in consequence of a 100% tax, the gold coin of \$10 can be reduced to half size, and it will again represent full market metal-value; so the standard for currency remains undisturbed for all future.

How many of the people are aware when they take in a slip of paper printed with the mighty word “one Dollar,” called bank note, that this slip has a currency value of only about 45 per cent, only 45 cents or thereabout, being covered at the U. S. Treasury? And how many people know that the silver coin of one dollar is not worth more than the paper slip, because the value of the silver contained in the silver dollar is about 45 cents, or thereabouts? Has ever anyone been afraid of taking the banknote, or the silver coin at full value? Every person in U. S. A. takes this money at full value in as big heaps as possible. I may even add that every person is **bound** to accept it at full value; and there is no objection to this, never. Now, does anyone believe that the same people would refuse to accept a gold coin for \$10— if that coin were in future only half the size of what it is now? When it is a **worldwide agreement** to reduce the size of all the gold coins to half of what they are now, every government will readily follow that agreement, because it is fully at the treasury's advantage. And there would be no power on earth above the governments to object to this new method of “shaping the gold coin.” When you then buy an overcoat for \$50, the salesman will not ask from you 10 coins at \$10, because the shape is smaller; he will be glad enough to have the five coins in his hand, and pay them over in the very same shape to the building owner as rent, and so on.

Would this new currency overthrow the international exchange?

No, I do not think so; and will explain this, too:

You will best understand my reasoning when I put a case of de-

viation. When all the governments of the world are to agree on this universal scheme of taxing gold by a 100 per cent tax, then all the gold that leaves the gold-producing countries will double in value henceforth. Not the gold mines are the winners, no; the customhouse, and the inland revenue, are the winner of the 100 per cent tax. Now, if we put the case that U. S. A. for instance would deviate from the agreement and decide that she will levy 150 per cent tax? What would then happen? A coin of the shape of the actual \$10 coin, instead of having the figure of \$20 on the face, would figure at \$25. The immediate consequence would be that all the foreign countries would refuse to accept this coin at the value of \$25, would only recognize \$20 for it, as agreed upon by worldwide understanding. And the people of U. S. A. in accepting at the postoffice the coin at \$25, would find that the banker would not take it, that he would exclude all gold coins and ask silver coins, because he cannot use a coin which is not recognized by the foreign countries. U. S. A. could not endure such a situation for more than twenty-four hours; there you see again what business-war means, in effect!

Taking now the opposite case: That U. S. A. would levy a tax of 60 per cent only, instead of the 100 per cent. What then?

The coin of \$10 of today would show the figure of \$16, instead of \$20. No foreign country would object to this, I am sure. In contrary, a great draft of tourists would flock into U. S. A., bring all the U. S. A. money that Europe can produce in her vaults, over here; would run the country to collect U. S. A. gold coins, and enjoy a good stay at the expense of the U. S. Treasury. You must bear in mind that gold coins do not pay duty when you cross from one country to the other. That would have to be included in the new agreement, as the tax of 100 per cent is considered to be levied by that particular country which has coined the gold money. So all the governments of the world must surmise that U. S. A. has a gold money with the 100 per cent tax, and if the treasury at Washington finds pleasure in coining her gold money at a cheaper price, it is only a concern of hers, and the foreign governments have no right to levy the 40 per cent which Washington is thought to have spared for the happy U. S. nation. But as a natural consequence the foreign tourist would collect the gold coins, would pay his bills in U. S. A. bank notes; take the gold coins home with him, bring them to his own treasury, and have then recoined, gaining thereby the 40 per cent value, less cost of coinage. Is any financier objecting to this reasoning? U. S. A. is too much of a "business-nation," than to expect from her such a "mistake" as I have pointed out here, only as illustrating example. Rely on that! We have seen that the gold mines would not gain anything by the new tax. But would the banker gain, by accruing in his vaults a great heap of gold before the tax enters in force?

As a matter of course, the governments would have to issue an order to the effect that all the gold in the vaults has to be disclosed at the treasury, so that from this gold too, the tax of 100 per cent

can be levied. It is relatively easy to find out the gold treasures of the banks. The gold coins hidden by the banker will not gain in the least, because they will keep their old figure of value, and their old shape and effigy. And as I suppose that the government would inform the public in the issue that old gold coins after a certain time would lose so much in their value as the government finds fit, the people will run to the assigned place for exchange and receive the new coins in distribution. Again you see what business-war means; much more than the greatest police force. From the gold ingots produced, instead of making the "poor" owner pay the heavy tax, it would be simplified for him by assaying the average value of his gold ingots and keep half of them back as duty paid in good gold; with the rest of the gold, much "relieved," he could turn his step home again and be glad that his pocketbook has not suffered in the least by this tax! If you think, however, that he has lost in property, by the reduction of his gold stock, then let me point out to you that there you are mistaken. Say the man had 10 lbs. of good gold when he was dragging his burden to the Treasury, and returned home with 5 lbs. only. These 5 lbs. are now worth exactly the same money as formerly the stock of 10 lbs., because the 5 lbs. have gained 100% in market-value, through the now effected taxation! Is that clear? Is that not wonderful?

I know but one man who would suffer. The goldsmith, because he has to pay double for his "raw material." At the same time he would gain inasmuch as his finished goods can be increased in prize the very day the gold tax comes into force. I suppose that the government cannot levy the tax on gold bought and worked by the dealer before the tax was declared. So we have a plaster for the heartache of this poor tradesman who deals in gold, by letting him profit by the increase of price without levying the tax on his goods momentarily in stock. He could recover from his shock, and get ready for better times when in consequence of the tying up of the war, the business man is again indulging in the pleasure of wasting his wealth on gold items.

I said, a few lines before, that Great Britain, and particularly Great Britain, has it fully in her hand to walk the path which I see in my idea. And I will prove this to you:

When we speak of taxing gold, then we are at once brought in the presence of those countries which produce gold. And now let us have a look at the map of the world which shows the gold-producing countries: They are all on the side of the T. E., or are neutral! Neither Germany, nor Austria, nor Bulgaria, nor Turkey come into the question when we look at the gold-producing countries. Do you agree to this? And if yes, then you will share my opinion that Great Britain, as Champion of her party, has it fully in her hand to step that way.

Could the Central Empires and their allied nations oppose such step of the T. E?

I do not believe so, and will tell you why:

The Teutonic powers are as much in need of the "new money" as are the opponents, no doubt about that. And for the Central Empires the hope of scoring a definite final victory is as far away as that of the opponent. And then, bear in mind that the Central Empires are blocked up in themselves against the outerworld, so they cannot turn the rest of the world back to the old path if the world would choose to step in the new one. Taking it now as granted that all the world except the D. B. party would walk this new path and avail themselves of the treasures pouring into their governmental pocketbook, the Central Empires will simply find themselves **compelled** to follow the same path, because they would find themselves in minority on the financial market, and would lose their gold coins as I have pointed out in the illustrating example of U. S. A. And what is still more of importance: As a matter of course the Central Empires will be forced to pay in gold for a while after peace has been concluded, until the balance of trade is again in the horizontal equilibrium. For this necessity alone, the Central Empires see themselves forced to look out for gold coins which will be accepted in the opponents' camp, and we see the marvelous fact that the Central Empires by receiving a war indemnity from the T. E., simply receive a money that has doubled in value to the advantage of the debtor, and which is going again into the hands of the debtor at that double value, in advantage of the Central Empires. Is that not wonderful in itself? Would the Central Empires oppose such a nice play? I do not think so, and that brings us a big step nearer to future peace.

And when hereafter I handle the mathematical side of my suggestion, then please bear in mind that I do not take into account all the big gold treasures still hidden in the European bankers' vaults; that when I make the account only with the status of the state banks, there is still a big additional gain to be expected for the treasuries, from all the gold coined and in ingots, which on the date of my status was not yet brought to daylight.

Please let me conduct you now into the dry field of mathematics; and I shall feel greatly indebted to any financier who will correct any eventual blunder that he thinks he discovers in my tabularies. Don't mind at all about correcting an officer, if this is to the benefit of the interested public. I will deal all figures in full round shape; a hundred million dollars don't matter for the "clean-up" of the world's cashbook!

By levying the tax on gold of 100 per cent, the governments gain in two directions: On the gold already in hand, and on the gold they produce in their countries.

I will quote the four powers first in interest: Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany.

SAVINGS in the Treasuries, 100 per cent gold tax:

Status state bank.	Gold stock, rated per dollar.	In dollars.
England ..Dec. 9, '15	Lst. 50,500,000 @ Sh. 4/9 ..\$	240 Millions
France ...Dec. 2, '15	Frs. 4,877,510,000 @ Fr. 5.40..	900 Millions
Russia Dec. 4, '15	Rou 1,608,100,000 @ Ro. 2.00..	900 Millions
	and 228,100,000 @	
Germany ..Nov. 30, '15	Mk. 2,435,254,000 @ Mk. 5.00..	480 Millions

Total gain through new coinage.....\$2,520 Millions

Gains on gold exports, 100 per cent on the value of production:

Great Britain—

Canada, gold production, yearly approx.....	\$ 12 Millions
South Africa, gold production, yearly approx.....	210 Millions
Australia, gold production, yearly approx.....	50 Millions
India, gold production, yearly approx.....	13 Millions

Yearly gain for Great Britain and colonies.....\$285 Millions
Of which we will reckon 50 per cent for the use of the sinking of the war bonds of Great Britain, the rest going into the ordinary budget of the respective colonies.

France and Colonies, gold production, yearly approx..\$ 7 Millions
Russia, gold production, yearly approx..... 22 Millions

France and Russia having full power over all their gold taxes, we can take the respective amounts in full for the war debts.

Now we will make separate account for each of the four powers in question, in round figures, taking every saving in account too.

Savings on the military and naval budget of the powers:

Expenditure
for future
small army and

	Mil. and Nav. expend. before the war:	for pensions resulting from present war:	Approximate savings pro year:
Great Britain	\$250 Millions	\$100 Millions	\$150 Millions
France	320 Millions	100 Millions	220 Millions
Russia	440 Millions	130 Millions	310 Millions
Germany	240 Millions	130 Millions	110 Millions

I rate Germany for the future as high as Russia in consequence of the high figure of pensions which that empire will have to pay to all the invalid and widows and orphans, Germany being the Champion of the field who has given the heaviest sacrifice of life on the altar of the contest.

For the understanding of my figures regarding expenditure for future small armies I wish to mention, that Switzerland had a yearly

expenditure of \$8 Millions, and it is said that this expenditure was enough to give Switzerland the army which has been praised in many quarters, so, for instance, by Kaiser Wilhelm, who surely knows to appreciate a soldier to his true value.

For further guidance please recall Chapter 6 back to your mind.

The war loans of the four powers may be rated as follows:

Great Britain, \$5,000 Millions, including U. S. A. Franco-British bonds.

France, \$3,000 Millions, plus \$900 Millions advance from Great Britain; plus \$5,000 Millions war indemnity to Germany, including Lorraine.

Russia, \$4,000 Millions, plus \$900 Millions advance from Great Britain; plus \$3,000 Millions old debt to France.

Germany, \$6,000 Millions, less war indemnity from France.

For Great Britain, France and Germany I rate the interest on the *al par* sum of the war loans at 5 per cent per annum; for Russia at 6 per cent, except the old debt to France as to which I do not know whether Russia will have to pay interest after this war.

I surmise that the surrender of the French territory and of Lorraine to France, and the surrender of Poland and Kurland to Germany includes all the government assets of these territories going over to the new owner of the country.

Great Britain—

War bonds	\$5,000	Millions
Less return from French Treasury	900*	Millions
Less return from Russian Treasury	900*	Millions

*Gain on new gold coinage.

Net	\$3,200	Millions
Less gain on new coinage in British Treasury.....	240	Millions

To pay off\$2,960 Millions

To cover this debt, and for the interest thereon, Great Britain finds at her disposal:

Savings on the military and naval budget, per annum....	\$150	Millions
Fifty per cent gold tax on the gold exported.....	143	Millions

Total	\$293	Millions
Five per cent interest on \$2,960 Millions require.....	148	Millions

There remains for the paying off of war bonds per annum \$145 Millions

Considering that by paying off every year the huge sum of 145 Million Dollars, the interest will accordingly sink also, the paying off of the whole debt will probably be finished in **ca. 15 years.**

France—

War bonds	\$3,000 Millions
Plus war indemnity to Germany, including Lorraine.	5,000 Millions

Total, exclusive of advance from Great Britain..\$8,000 Millions

The gain in the Treasury, effected by the new coinage of the gold coins, bringing the sum of \$900 Millions net, is immediately turned over to Great Britain in settlement of her advances for the war; this in order to satisfy Great Britain, and to save interest on this sum. This sum comes therefor not in account for France's debt, respecting war bonds.

I will rate the yearly income of the governmental enterprises in Lorraine, less expenditure, at the sum of \$40 Millions, including customhouse taxes, railway earnings, forest and dominion profits.

For the sinking of the above debt and the interest thereon, France can dispose of:

Savings on military and naval budget, per annum.....	\$220 Millions
Gain on gold tax on gold exported, per annum.....	7 Millions
Payments coming in from Russia, per annum.....	100 Millions
Profits and earnings in Lorraine, per annum.....	40 Millions

Total\$367 Millions

Five per cent interest on \$3,000 war bonds require per annum	150 Millions
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There remains for the paying off of war bonds per annum\$217 Millions
Of which sum \$200 Millions (Mk. 1,000 Millions) go every year to Germany, for 25 years. The debt will be paid in **ca. 30 years**.

Russia—

War bonds	\$4,000 Millions
Plus debt due to France on old account.....	3,000 Millions

To pay off\$7,000 Millions

Gain on new coinage in Treasury switched over to Great Britain in settlement of war advances.

For the sinking of the above war debt, plus 6 per cent interest thereon, Russia has at her disposal:

Savings on the military and naval budget, per annum....	\$310 Millions
Gain on gold tax on gold exported and produced.....	22 Millions

Per year\$332 Millions

Six per cent interest on war debt

\$4,000 Millions	\$240 Millions
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Yearly payments to France, free of interest 100 Millions^{per}

—————\$ 340 Millions

So we see that Russia cannot pay off her war debt out of the savings made on military and naval budget and with her gold tax; but supposing that Russia would continue to levy the war taxes that she is levying now during the war, and which I rate at a **minimum of \$200 Millions** per year (Roubles, 400 Millions), Russia would be able to sweep off her war bonds in about **20 years**. We must take in account hereby that Russia is losing her income on governmental properties, customhouse taxes, etc., of all the territories in Poland and Kurland which she is supposed to surrender to Germany and Poland respectively.

If Russia is bound to pay interest on the sum of \$3,000 Millions old debt to France, this interest will absorb another \$180 Millions per year; Russia will then want about 50 years to sweep her whole debt; and France will shorten this period for her debt by **ca. 14 years**.

Germany—

War bonds	\$6,000 Millions
Less gain in Treasury on recoinage of gold.....	480 Millions

To pay off	\$5,520 Millions
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Germany has at her disposal:

Savings on the military and naval budget per year.....	\$ 110 Millions
Payments coming in from France for 25 years.....	200 Millions
Yearly net income from Kurland from governmental properties, customhouse, etc., min.....	20 Millions
Payments coming in from the new Kingdom of Poland for propriety conquered by Germany, and receded to the new Kingdom of Poland, per annum.....	40 Millions

Total disposable	\$ 370 Millions
Less 5 per cent interest on war bonds, net, per year....	276 Millions

For the paying off there remains a surplus of\$ 94 Millions

per year; this surplus and the savings on interest on sums paid off will permit Germany to sweep her war bonds in **ca. 60-70 years**.

I will not close this very important financial chapter without having drawn your kind attention to the following interesting points in the matter.

By rating the savings on the military and naval budgets I footed on the **ordinary** budgets of the respective countries of the time **before** the war. So the saving will be greatly superior when you foot your own evaluation of the savings on what is disbursed for military and naval **now** for the purpose of the war; this does not yet include what we term "war expenditure," as the war expenditure deals only the effec-

tive expenditures of the armies in the field and of the reserve bodies of the second line, which do service in the countries conquered and garrisoned during the time of occupation.

The interest paid by France and Russia on the war bonds is somewhat superior to what I count in my suggestions; but we must consider that I count the interest on the full amount of the war bonds, not on the value at which they were sold to the public; and we must further consider that the war bonds can be exchanged after 5 resp. 10 years by the governments against new bonds paying less interest in the future. So for the average the 5 per cent, resp. 6 per cent for Russia, will fairly cover the facts.

Interest saved on sums paid off to be applied to the sinking funds.

When the war bonds are cleared, fully paid off, savings on the military and naval budget, and the gain on the gold exported, the gold tax, will still continue to exist as a very appreciable income of the governments who enjoy the production of gold in their territory. The military and naval expenditure being so much lower than in the time before the war, the governments have two ways to profit by this: Either they can apply that saving to social work, which is always appreciated everywhere; or the governments will reduce the taxes on the most necessary items of life for the sum saved from the iron moloch, and maintain all the other items of the budget on the same figures as in the time before the war.

So you see what it would mean to levy a tax on gold, a tax that does not hurt anybody in his pocketbook, a tax that would bring overnight the great riches of \$2,520 Millions minimum, to the four powers mentioned, not to speak of the U. S. A. Treasury and all the other treasuries all around the whole globe; a tax that will continue for all the time gold is produced on this world. The workingman f. i. would only then suffer when he is about to buy a golden wedding ring for his bride; but I should say anyone who cannot afford to pay for the gold, better leave off buying that stuff, or better leave off marrying if he has not the money for the rings. If we can sweep the heavy war debts by that simple and practical way of taxing gold, this would surely find the approval of all the troubled peoples of the contesting countries, and of the rest of the world.

HEARTY APPEAL TO ALL FRIENDS OF PEACE.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

One year and a half of world-wide war, of great deeds of arms in all the camps hither and thither, of wonderful strategy in the field and on the waves, of amazing sacrifice of precious blood, of health and of wealth, have stunned the world as never before. With flaming letters the nations of Europe have written in the book of history that the twentieth century is as full of greatness, strength and sacrifice as any great time in all past history. Nobody would have dreamed anno 1913-14 of such feats, of such endurance; when the general public in all the large and small cities of the European Continent was indulging in luxury and well-living, in a sort of "dolce far niente," so much so that many serious onlookers were frightened and shocked.

Like a terrible shake-up, like a heavenly punishment such as old luxurious Pompeii has seen, the great war swept suddenly on merry Europe, thrilling every heart, even that of the hardest man, to the very depth of conscience. Within a few hours, millions of fathers and sons were torn from their safe, cozy homesteads, from the hearts of all the wives, children and parents, to march behind playing bands and waving colors to an uncertain fate, towards the field where every life is a mere nothing, compared with the great task that the hardy hero is called to fulfill. At that time, many a hardened man who had never seen a church from the inside for years of his life, never listened to any preacher of the Word of God, felt himself suddenly in the presence of the Almighty and sent, quite secretly, a warm prayer to heaven imploring the protection which he knew he could not receive from any human being. There I see the first good effect of the present war!

The war began as a war of "national defense" in the meaning I have disclosed to you in chapters 1-3 heretofore. But what do the parties fight for at the end of 1915?

I simply quote the announcements made by the Prime Minister and Parliaments of the two champions, Great Britain and Germany:

The principal aim of Great Britain and her valiant allies is nothing short of—complete crushing of Teutonic Imperialism—and of German Militarism!

The principal aim of Germany with her confederates and friends in arms is directed at the great British Eastern Empire, and at the "Ruler of the waves," allmighty supremacy of the sea!

In one all important point, the two parties meet in their almost

overstrained endeavors; the war's bill, which each champion wishes to shift completely on the shoulders of his opponent.

You champions of British and German blood, your valor, your great deeds, your patriotic sacrifices are fully recognized by friend and foe; you have made a history for your nations that surpasses that of Xerxes, of Alexander, and of Napoleon I. But you should not overlook what great sacrifices have been asked, and willingly responded to, by all the rest of the world, by the great and small neutral countries, especially by little Switzerland, which is in some way fully at your mercy. So long as you were fighting for "national defense" in the proper sense of the word, contained in your constitution, it was but just that neutral countries contributed to your safety by remaining in an armed neutrality, which means as much as holding off all treacherous strokes in your rear. Switzerland is thereby in the first place amongst the neutral countries, because Switzerland has to hold off the German and Austrian armies from an eventful sidetrip to Pontalier-Belfort; on the other side, the Swiss army was called to act as "antechamber-guard" to Germany and Austria, against unfriendly visits from France and Italy. But can you still expect from the neutral European brother nations, to remain a self-contented lot of paying, **heavy-paying** spectators of the great match that you fight against each other about Teutonic Imperialism, about British Imperialism, and about the money question of your own make? I wish to appeal to your loyal conscience, and you will give yourself the same reply which I, as a neutral Swiss, cannot help but find in my heart.

Not only small Switzerland, all the other suffering countries are as much anxious to see the hardy contest come to a speedy end. When anyone of you has shared, like me, the compartment in the train with soldiers wearing the iron cross or the medal of the legion d'honneur; with soldiers terribly disabled or paralyzed; with soldiers aching to the very bottom of their hearts in consequence of the misery and misfortune they have found in their homes; with soldiers who for many times have been taken to the hospital and have returned as many times to the front, not knowing whether they will again have the chance of "enjoying the favor of being wounded instead of dead," then you will feel like me: that a way must be found to end this war.

Friends of Peace

Your Field Is Ready for Your Seed!

Do Not Feel Discouraged by Failure of Previous Attempts

My experience gathered in frank conversation in Europe, which I crossed from the Mediterranean to the North seashore only a couple of months ago, has disclosed to me a way in which the seed might be brought to the hearts of the nations, and of the soldiers at war.

Peace must come **from the hands of the Champions**, and from their friends in arms; we neutral onlookers are but a sort of paying visitors in the arena of the world, where we see the performance of the two mightiest champions in a hardy, terrible match. But beware, when I say, "the hands of the champion," I do not mean the great leaders and heroic armies and navies! As an officer I know too well that the ruler in supreme command, the field marshals, the generals, and admirals, down to the last man in the rear, to the last blue jacket in the yard, **have to do their duty** in the sacred cause of their countries, **until that country recalls them from their honorable post!**

Peace must come **from the nations at war**; from their governments and parliaments. They represent the parties, and the armies and navies are called to care for what the nations wish; the protection of the sacred soil!

The way I see to work for future peace is frankly disclosed to you in my popular work. The seed is there before your eyes; cultivate it; improve it; propagate it to all your friends in both camps. That is **the way to the hearts** of the Champions, to prepare them for an honorable truce.

Before concluding my book, I wish to express a word more, for which I, only I, shall be made responsible.

It is a word of serious nature, coming from my own heart and being directed to nobody in particular; this I wish to state most emphatically. I cannot withhold from you some grave misapprehensions with regard to the Europe of 1916 if all endeavors for peace should continually fail. It is my personal opinion, not suggested from any part whatever, that the war cannot outlast the year without some still greater misfortune for Europe. There will be the question whether the neutral countries will be able, and will be willing, **to continue to remain in armed neutrality?** History of the past has given striking examples that nations, when too much strained by any war or warrior, gave vent to their wrath in terrible ways. In Chapter four I have openly, in frank neutral words, stated the situation of the **two Champions** in contest; both of them are victorious alike; for both, the time would be propitious to shake hands and throw the old worries in the wind. I have given you very simple ideas as to how the points in contest might be arraigned in honorable way for both parties, these ideas seem to me at least worthy the attention of the general public.

No matter whether **my** ideas, or **any** other ideas are practicable, **the Champions themselves must find their way to terms and peace.** I believe still in the Christianity of the European rulers, European governments and nations that they **will find** a way to peace **when their will is sincere.** Should one party in the contest prove too obstinate, too misregarding of the needs of Europe for peace; should there be a party who for selfish aspirations and overstrained ambitions would absolutely continue the murderous struggle; then we will probably see what I suspect: that all the rest of the European countries, the neutrals, will join their trimmed first-class soldiers to the Champion who has been ready for peace, but who found haughty rejection by the opponent. **That opponent will then see what the united efforts of all the hardy armies of Europe will bring in final settlement,** it will be a terrible punishment, such a punishment as never has been seen before. Don't smile when such a word comes from a Swiss Officer, whose country is the smallest, the most exposed to the thrusts of the two big contesting parties. Do not doubt the bravery and high value of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Scandinavian, Danish, Roumanian and Greek armies and navies! I beg to inform you that small Switzerland, too, has trimmed her soldiers well for all eventualities. When I left my dear country in July, 1915, the spirit of the whole Swiss population was more patriotic, more willing to make great sacrifices for a happy future than ever. This warm spirit all over the country, in the smallest hamlets, assured me fully that there is still that blood in the veins of my compatriots which has been in old history so well recognized by foreign powers; I have but to mention the Swiss guard at the gates of the Tuilleries in Paris, which guard protected King Louis of France with their bodies, and the similar feat repeated at the Beresina, to cover the retreat of the exhausted grande armee of Napoleon the first.

May God the Almighty preserve unfortunate Europe from such a terrible final settlement of the great war!

Friends of Peace, arouse; give your help!

The soldier in the field has done his duty, his hardy trust of protecting your country against the enemy, in a way that befits the heroes of Europe of the twentieth century. Now is the time when YOU ought to go to work, when YOU ought to prove yourself worthy of your brothers in arms!

The Author: Pr-Lieut. Hans Oberhänsli.

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